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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, few would dispute that the right to die exists, in one form
or another, for those brazen or desperate enough to assert it in a
court of law. Despite the obvious social and philosophical problems
with such a shocking concept, the legal problems with the right to die
have been related more to administration than to recognition. Most
courts which have acknowledged the right to die (sometimes more
palatably phrased as "the right to refuse medical treatment") have
been more concerned with administrative problems than with recog-
nition of the right itself.
The law of death and dying has clearly failed to keep pace with
medical technology. Because of this gap between advances in medical
treatments and advances in the law, physicians and families of dying
patients are called upon to make disturbing personal decisions re-
garding the care of these patients without the benefit of clearly de-
fined guidelines.
A. The Bartling Case
One of the most recent illustrations of judicial inability to adminis-
ter a patient's right of privacy, which the court ironically found ex-
plicitly in the California Constitution and implicitly in the U.S.
Constitution's fifth and ninth amendments,1 is the case of Bartling v.
Superior Court (Glendale Adventist Medical Center).2
1. Bartling v. Superior Court (Glendale Adventist Medical Center), 163 Cal. App.
3d 186, 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (1984) (citing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 and Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
2. 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984).
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The decision came in a lawsuit first brought by William Francis
Bartling, a 70-year-old man who died of lung disease on the eve of ap-
peal after months of fighting to force doctors to disconnect his respi-
rator. Citing lack of guidelines in state law for hospitals in so-called
"right-to-die" cases, the California Second Appellate District agreed,
just hours after Bartling's death, to hear arguments and rule as if his
treatment were still at issue.3 No California appellate court had ever
articulated what rights a competent adult has to insist upon the dis-
continuation of life-sustaining medical treatment. With the court
rendering an opinion despite Bartling's death, the situation was glibly
labeled as "the only time in our nation's history that a competent, fa-
tally ill patient [was] forced to survive beyond his death."4 If
Bartling were still alive, the court added in a footnote, its mandatory
injunction would have read that he, "in the exercise of his right of
privacy, may remain in defendant hospital or leave said hospital free
of the mechanical respirator now attached to his body," 5 and the hos-
pital would be "restrained from interfering with Mr. Bartling's
decision." 6
This comment suggests that the crucial inquiry is to determine
when the hospital or the state has the right to interfere with one's
medical decisions. Incompetency would certainly be powerful justifi-
cation for encroaching on free choice since, as a matter of social or-
der, most people are not inclined to permit death and needless
destruction as the products of insane decisions.7 However, the
Bartling court saw no contradiction in Mr. Bartling's desire to live
and his preferring death to life on a respirator.S The unanimous
court ruled that an occasional waver from this view "because of se-
vere depression or for any other reason" did not justify the hospital's
argument that he lacked a sufficient level of competence to make
3. Both sides in this case have urged us to address the merits of the petition
and formulate guidelines which might prevent a reoccurrence of the tragedy
which befell Mr. Bartling. We agree that in light of the important questions
raised, this court should exercise its discretion to render an opinion in this
case despite its mootness.
IdE at 189, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 221 (citation omitted).
4. The Restater (published by Western State University College of Law), Jan.,
1985 at 7, col. 2.
5. 163 Cal. App. 3d at 197 n.8, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226 n.8.
6. Id
7. See, e.g., Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 196, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226; Superintendent
of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426
n.11 (1977) (the state has an interest in the prevention of irrational self-destruction).
8. 163 Cal. App. 3d at 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
such a crucial decision.9 Once it had determined Bartling's compe-
tence, the court stated that the major issue was whether the rights of
the doctors and the state interest in preserving life outweighed the
patient's rights. 10
This comment will analyze the Bartling decision in the context of
currently prevailing right-to-die law. Although there is some dispar-
ity in the lower court precedent recognizing that the constitutional
right to privacy sometimes includes the right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment, the United States Supreme Court has not yet
tested such authority. Nevertheless, a consensus does emerge, of
which Bartling is a compelling example.
II. THE COMPETING RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
The preservation of life, the need to protect innocent third parties,
the prevention of suicide, and the maintenance of the ethics of the
medical profession have been espoused as the chief interests which
compete with the rights of patients to be removed from life-sus-
taining treatment.1 ' These interests, compelling as they may seem,
are not without major opposition from those who side with the pa-
tient. The right of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment has
its origins in the constitutional right of privacy.12 "'In short, the law
recognizes the individual interest in preserving "the inviolability of
the person." ' "13 Moreover, the right of privacy guarantees to the in-
9. Id. at 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223-24.
10. Id. at 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
11. Id; see also Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741-44, 370 N.E.2d at 425-27. These are gen-
erally regarded as the state's competing interests in right-todie cases. It should be
noted, however, that these interests are neither absolute nor exclusive; other interests
have been delineated. See, e.g., Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255,
266, 399 N.E.2d 452, 458 (1979) (treatment deemed necessary to insure orderly prison
administration); Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 447, 452, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 531, 534
(1980), modified sub nom. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266
(1981) (the state's economic interests are also a consideration when it intercedes to
mandate life-sustaining treatment).
Assuming a sufficient justification exists, the state may also compel life-sustaining
treatment for newborns, even if the family does not want state assistance. See Medical
Ethics: The Right to Surviva 1974: Hearings on Examination of the Medical and Eth-
ical Problems Faced With the Agonizing Decision of Life and Death Before the Sub-
comm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 13 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Hearings]; Goldstein, Medical Care for the
Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 657
(1977); see also Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutional, Legal, and
Policy Analysis, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1345 (1981); Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal" Health
Care: The Hidden Legal Issues, 59 TEX. L. REv. 1401 (1981).
12. The Bartling court emphasized that this right is specifically guaranteed in the
California Constitution and has been found to exist in the "penumbra" of rights guar-
anteed by the fifth and ninth amendments to the United States Constitution. 163 Cal.
App. 3d at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225; see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
13. 163 Cal. App. 3d at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225 (quoting Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at
739, 370 N.E.2d at 424).
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dividual the freedom to choose to reject, or refuse to consent to, in-
trusions of one's bodily integrity.14
A. The Preservation of Life
The most significant state interest is, of course, the preservation of
life.15 However, the Bartling court's assessment of the competing
state interest in the preservation of life is not evident from the rec-
ord. Neither a traditional balancing test-nor any other similar analy-
sis is present in the opinion. The court reiterated the significance of
this competing interest, but it failed to address any notion of preserv-
ing Mr. Bartling's life.16 Moreover, the court did not exhibit any ap-
prehension in holding Mr. Bartling legally competent, despite the
wavering in his decision due to severe depression or some other rea-
son.' 7 The court felt that his decision was not impaired "to the point
of legal incompetency."' 8
The problem with the court's silence regarding the preservation of
14. Id. See also Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 745, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
15. This was the prime contention of the hospital in Bartling. The doctors submit-
ted a declaration that they were a "pro-life" hospital and that most of the staff would
view disconnecting the life-support system as inconsistent with the healing orientation
of physicians. 163 Cal. App. 3d at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225. The court, however, was
quick to subordinate this contention, stating, "if the right of the patient to self-deter-
mination as to his own medical treatment is to have any meaning at all, it must be
paramount to the interests of the patient's hospital and doctors." Id
16. The court merely stated that the patient's privacy right "must be paramount to
the interests of the. . . hospital and doctors." Id. The court emphasized that the right
of a competent adult patient to refuse medical treatment is a constitutionally guaran-
teed right which must not be abridged; presumably, it cannot even be abridged by the
medical profession. But is this equally true where the state wishes to abridge the exer-
cise of this right? When is it necessary or proper for a court of law to abridge this
constitutional right on behalf of the state? The only guideline indirectly suggested by
the majority is competency. The court subliminally indicates that if there is no issue
regarding the legal competence of the patient then there is no issue as to the legality
of refusing treatment. 163 Cal. App. 3d at 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223-24. This is, of
course, a sensible social objective. One would hope there exists some societal reluc-
tance to allow self-destruction where there is genuine doubt as to the patient's sanity
or competency. Decisions which may reflect delusional thinking, psychotic depression,
or some other condition of irrationality would hopefully be prevented. However, the
court did little in the way of analyzing Mr. Bartling's competency; more would cer-
tainly be expected if competency or sanity is to be the fulcrum of judicial analysis in
right-to-die cases. Admittedly, it would have been difficult for the Bartling court to
challenge Mr. Bartling's competence because of his untimely death on the eve of ap-
peal. For an in-depth treatment of right-to-die issues involving incompetent patients,
see Comment, In re Storar: The Right to Die and Incompetent Patients, 43 U. PIrrr. L.
REV. 1087 (1982).
17. 163 Cal. App. 3d at 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
18. I& Perhaps the court was quite correct in this regard. There is no fathomable
reason why a 70-year-old man, suffering from five incurable illnesses, should be pre-
life issue is that no guidelines are provided for future courts called
upon to make decisions in the next right-to-die case. What happens if
the next patient who seeks to assert his or her rights is 24 years old
and suffering from only one terminal disease instead of five? What if
the patient prefers death to a painful life on a kidney machine in-
stalled in his home? Would the result be the same? Would he or she
be summarily determined competent for the purposes of assessing
the soundness of the decision? Such criticism of the Bartling analysis
might otherwise be misplaced if not for the court's self-stated objec-
tive of establishing viable guidelines for future cases. 19
If the court intended its decision to provide guidelines for future
cases, these guidelines are sadly lacking. One could infer from the
court's opinion that future cases should require a showing of incom-
petency based on evidence entirely independent of the patient's deci-
sion.20  Aside from this inferred requirement of independent
evidence establishing competence, 21 little can be gleaned from the
Bartling decision as to how competing interests should be weighed.
It is worth noting that the court did not acknowledge "a terminal
condition" as being prerequisite to exercising one's right to refuse
medical treatment.22 Bartling actually establishes only that success-
ful patients in future cases must be adults, must be legally competent
(and are apparently presumed so absent an independent showing of
incompetence), and must be incurably, although not necessarily ter-
minally, ill. In all such cases, according to Bartling, the constitution-
sumed incompetent merely because he preferred death to an extremely painful life in
a hospital.
19. The novel medical, legal and ethical issues presented in this case are no
doubt capable of repetition and therefore should not be ignored by relying on
the mootness doctrine. This requires us to set forth a framework in which
both the medical and legal professions can deal with similar situations.
163 Cal. App. 3d at 189, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 221 (quoting Dority v. Superior Court, 145
Cal. App. 3d 273, 276, 193 Cal. Rptr. 288, 290 (1983)).
20. This would ensure that a patient is not presumed incompetent or insane be-
cause he merely seeks to exercise his right to refuse treatment.
21. The language of the majority suggesting a requirement of independent evi-
dence of the patient's incompetency is exemplified by the following:
Mr. Bartling knew he would die if the ventilator were disconnected but never-
theless preferred death to life sustained by mechanical means .... The fact
that Mr. Bartling periodically wavered from this posture ... does not justify
the conclusion ... that his capacity to make such a decision was impaired to
the point of legal incompetency.
163 Cal. App. 3d at 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223-24. This seems to imply that any showing
of incompetency must be based on evidence independent of the decision to terminate
treatment, or on evidence of the patient's lacking the capacity to appreciate the fact
that removal will hasten his own death.
22. The court defined its task as one of determining "whether a competent adult
patient, with serious illnesses which are probably incurable but have not been diag-
nosed as terminal," has the right to have life-support equipment removed, despite the
fact that doing so will surely hasten his own death. 163 Cal. App. 3d at 189, 209 Cal.
Rptr. at 221.
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ally guaranteed right to refuse medical treatment "must not be
abridged"23
B. Fear of Civil and Criminal Liability
Several doctors in the Bartling case expressed the view that discon-
necting the ventilator would have been tantamount to aiding a sui-
cide. The court, however, emphasized that Mr. Bartling's death
would not have been brought about by unnatural means if the respi-
rator were disconnected. "Rather, they would merely have hastened
his inevitable death by natural causes." 24
As to criminal liability, the Bartling court found the issue substan-
tially answered in Barber v. Superior Court,25 wherein the defendant
physicians were charged with murder and conspiracy to commit mur-
der.26 Although the appellate court found the actions of the physi-
cians to be intentional and done with the knowledge that the patient
would die, the court found no criminal liability.27 The Bartling court
distinguished Barber on the grounds that the Bartling case was a civil
action where the patient was not comatose, as was the patient in Bar-
ber. These distinctions notwithstanding, the court was "satisfied
[that] the law as outlined is clear and if Mr. Bartling had lived real
parties could not have been criminally or civilly liable for carrying
out his instructions." 28
23. Id at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
24. Id at 196, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225. The court again favored quotation over
analysis:
The interest in protecting against suicide seems to require little if any discus-
sion. In the case of the competent adult's refusing medical treatment such an
act does not necessarily constitute suicide since (1) in refusing treatment the
patient may not have the specific intent to die, and (2) even if he did, to the
extent that the cause of death was from natural causes the patient did not set
the death producing agent in motion with the intent of causing his own death.
• . . Furthermore, the underlying State interest in this area lies in the pre-
vention of irrational self-destruction. What we consider here is a competent,
rational decision to refuse treatment when death is inevitable and the treat-
ment offers no hope of cure or preservation of life. There is no connection
between the conduct here in issue and any State concern to prevent suicide.
Id at 196, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226 (quoting Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d at
426 n.11).
25. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
26. Id. at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
27. Id. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
28. 163 Cal. App. 3d. at 197, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226. The court added:
Furthermore, in future similar situations, parties facing the problems con-
fronting real parties here should be free to act according to the patient's in-
struction without fear of liability and without advance court approval. In
accord with our conclusion is the Barber court's statement that ".... in the
C. Maintaining Medical Ethics
The Bartling court made it clear that the preservation of medical
ethics, while a laudable consideration, is patently subordinate to the
privacy interests of the patient. The court expressed its confidence in
the moral and ethical beliefs of Glendale Adventist Hospital and the
position it had taken in this case.29 However, the court emphasized
that the right of the patient to determine his own medical treatment
must be paramount to the interests of the medical profession, if that
right is to have any meaning at all.30
D. Protection of Innocent Third Parties
Although not discussed in the Bartling case, 31 the protection of in-
nocent third parties as a state interest has been invoked, for example,
where the patient attempting to refuse treatment has minor children
who would be left without a parent should the cessation of treatment
result in the patient's death. 32 In addition to the protection of minor
children, the state has a clear interest in seeing that persons honor
their obligation to support and care for their dependents. Otherwise,
the state itself would have to provide for these dependents.
III. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH BARTLING AS A GUIDELINE
The problems with the Bartling standard for "pulling the plug" are
largely self-evident. Among these are concerns arising from the lack
of certainty in the case of a patient who vacillates in his decision.
Furthermore, attribution problems arise when a patient wishes to be
removed from life-support because of "severe depression" or other
similar reasons.33 Which decision does the hospital honor when the
absence of legislative guidance, we find no legal requirement that prior judi-
cial approval is necessary before any decision to withdraw treatment can be
made."
Id. (quoting Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493).
29. 163 Cal. App. 3d at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
30. Id. Courts do not view the interest of maintenance of the ethical integrity of
the medical profession as a strong state interest. See, e.g., Myers, 379 Mass. at 265, 399
N.E.2d at 458. The interest is relevant, however, when medical personnel seek to ad-
minister treatment and the patient or his guardians will not consent. Under the guise
of protecting the ethical integrity of physicians, the state has a pretext by which to in-
tervene so that health professionals will not be forced to allow a person to die whom
they feel duty-bound to save.
31. 163 Cal. App. 3d at 195 n.6, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225 n.6.
32. Id. The leading case in this area is In re President and Directors of Ge-
orgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964), in
which the court ordered blood transfusions over the patient's religious objections
where she had to care for a seven-month-old child. See also United States v. George,
239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965) (39-year-old father of four objected to blood transfu-
sions on religious grounds).
33. Is it conscionable to accept the patient's decision to perish when the basis for
that decision is attributable to depression, shock, or some other debilitated state? The
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patient decides one day to be removed and the next day to continue
treatment? Is this type of vacillation distinguishable from that in
which a patient manifests no change of decision until he is nearly as-
phyxiated from being without oxygen for three and a half minutes?34
A. When is Self-Destruction Rational?
The Bartling court confirmed that one of the state interests in
competition with the patient's right to be removed from life-sus-
taining medical treatment is the "prevention of irrational self-de-
struction."35 The question which naturally arises is whether a proper
inquiry can be made into the rationality of the patient's decision
without specific guidelines designed for that purpose. A further ques-
tion arises as to who will make this determination.3 6
Bartling court evidenced a conspicious disregard for the inherent problems of such a
decision. On the one hand, the court ratified the state interest in the "prevention of
irrational self-destruction," see supra note 24; yet, on the other hand, it was not con-
cerned with the fact that Mr. Bartling wavered in his decision "because of severe de-
pression or for any other reason." 163 Cal. App. 3d at 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224. The
fact that Mr. Bartling had a history of "chronic acute anxiety/depression" and alcohol-
ism did not concern the court either. See id& at 189-90, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
34. Although they did not challenge his legal competency, the doctors and Glen-
dale Adventist contested Mr. Bartling's ability to make a meaningful decision because
of his vacillation. Id. at 192, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223. The challenge was based on the dec-
larations of several nurses who related instances in which the ventilator tube acciden-
tally detached and Mr. Bartling signalled frantically for them to reconnect it. Mr.
Bartling had also made several statements to his doctors and nurses in which he indi-
cated that "he wanted to live and did not want the ventilator disconnected." Id. The
question which arises is whether such conduct amounts to vacillation at all. Could not
such a reaction be more properly attributed to involuntary reflex mechanisms than to
vacillation? Must one go out with a smile on his face to sufficiently manifest the cer-
tainty of his intentions? Instead of choking to death, must one peacefully asphyxiate
to be sure that his life and death decision will remain uncontested? The Bartling court
again avoided touching on a difficult question by declining to confront the practical
problems presented and by failing to address its implications in future cases. Instead,
the court likened the alleged vacillation of Mr. Bartling to that of an amputation pa-
tient in Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978). The court dis-
missed the vacillation issue with a brief quotation from Lane, stating, "the fact that
[the patient] has vacillated in her resolve not to submit to the operation does not jus-
tify a conclusion that her capacity to make the decision is impaired to the point of legal
incompetence." 163 Cal. App. 3d at 192 n.3, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223 n.3 (quoting Lane, 6
Mass. App. Ct. at 384, 376 N.E.2d at 1236).
35. See supra note 24.
36. One of the apparent objectives of the Bartling court was to keep such determi-
nations out of the courts. 163 Cal. App. 3d at 197, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226. Who, then, is
left to determine the rationality of such decisions? Such power cannot be given to doc-
tors or hospitals without creating inherent conflicts of interest, especially where it is
the medical professionals who usually oppose the removal in the first place. Regard-
less, the Bartling court made it clear that the patient's rights are flatly superior to the
interests of the medical profession. Id. at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
No one appears more appropriate to decide the rationality of the
patient's decision than the courts. However, even on a case-by-case
basis, a court of law may justifiably find itself hampered in deciding
the rationality of such a decision without appropriate guidelines.37
Guidelines might also be necessary to ensure uniformity among such
decisions. Without a yardstick for assessing the soundness of pa-
tients' and guardians' decisions, essentially similar cases might
wrongly produce different results.3 8
There should be no mistake that the determination of a patient's
right to die under present law is purely a judgment call.39 What may
seem irrational to the doctors may seem eminently reasonable to the
legally competent but suffering patient. Moreover, what may seem
rational for a 70-year-old man expected to live for another year may,
under otherwise identical circumstances, seem virtually misanthropic
for an 18-year-old boy.40 It is indeed difficult to consider the rational-
ity of the decision from any point of view but the patient's; after all,
it will be the patient who is most affected by the ruling. A ruling in
favor of continuing treatment against the patient's will is especially
37. See Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1014, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
38. See, e.g., Is There a Right to Die - Quickly?, 80 J. PEDIATRICS 904, 905 (1972)
(two differing opinions regarding treatment of children with meningomyeloceles); El-
lis, Letting Defective Babies Die: Who Decides?, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 393 (1982) (legisla-
ture should set guidelines for parents and physicians to ensure that decisions will be
consistent, predictable, adequately informed, and in accord with community values).
39. Current case and statutory law does establish a right to die in certain in-
stances. The procedures used to implement this right are so confusing, however, that
it cannot be asserted effectively. It is possible for the courts to create law in this area,
but "[b]ecause the issue with all its ramifications is fraught with complexity and en-
compasses the interests of the law, both civil and criminal, medical ethics and social
morality, it is not one which is well-suited for resolution in an adversary judicial pro-
ceeding." Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980). Indeed, at present, only
11 states have codified a statutory right to die. Those states are: Alabama, ALA. CODE
§§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -3804 (Supp. 1983);
California, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1985); Idaho,
IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (Supp. 1983); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to
-28,108 (Supp. 1983); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.550-.690 (1983); New Mexico, N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -7-11 (1981); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323
(Supp. 1983); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050-.090 (1983); Texas, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1985); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.122.010-
.122.905 (Supp. 1985).
Even with statutory guidelines, the Battling court noted the procedural require-
ments of the California Natural Death Act were "so cumbersome that it is unlikely
that any but a small number of highly educated and motivated patients will be able to
effectuate their desires." 163 Cal. App. 3d at 194 n.5, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224 n.5 (quoting
Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1015, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 489).
40. In a landmark case, the court observed that doctors distinguished "between
curing the ill and comforting and easing the dying; that they refuse to treat the curable
as if they were dying or ought to die, and that they have sometimes refused to treat
the hopeless and dying as if they were curable." In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 47, 355 A.2d
647, 667, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See also Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 742, 370
N.E.2d at 425-26 (state interest declines where the patient's life is merely prolonged
and not preserved).
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troublesome where the treatment is physically painful or the patient
never adjusts to his condition psychologically.41 The more miserable
the patient's life, the more inherently rational his decision would
seem.
Should this then be our standard for determining rationality - the
miserableness of the patient's condition? If so, it begs the question.
It is most unlikely that a patient would ever assert his right to die on
his own behalf without being somewhat miserable. It is indeed diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to determine when it is or is not rational for a
patient to choose death over life. But it is no less difficult to compel
a suffering patient to live against his will, especially where the treat-
ment compelled is painful and intrusive. 2
B. When, If Ever, Is There No Hope of Cure or Preservation?
In further examining the rationality and competency of a decision
to refuse treatment, the Bartling court adopted the contention that a
proper decision might be rationally made where "death is inevita-
ble"43 and there is "no hope of cure or preservation of life."44 These
standards are completely useless as guidelines. When could it ever be
sensibly argued that death is not inevitable, or that there is abso-
lutely no hope of cure or preservation of life? If a patient is expected
to live for more than one year, there is always a justifiable hope of
developing a cure, or at least a more effective treatment. Moreover,
if there is not at least some medical capability of preserving the pa-
tient's life, the patient has little to contest.4 5
C When Does the State Have a Meaningful or Effective Interest?
Under the Bartling standard, could there ever be a case where the
state interest in preserving life would prevail over the patient's right
to refuse treatment? The Bartling court made it clear that the state
41. If the life sought to be continued by the compelled treatment will be brief,
painful, or extended only by a great degree of bodily intrusion, the state's interest is
minimized. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), aff'd, 379 So.
2d 359 (Fla. 1980). See also Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,
373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
42. See supra note 41.
43. 163 Cal. App. 3d at 196, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226 (quoting Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at
743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.11).
44. Id.
45. Obviously, if medical technology could do nothing to preserve the patient's life,
he would either already be dead or have nothing from which to seek removal.
interests in preventing suicide and maintaining the ethical integrity
of the medical profession were of little concern when in competition
with individual rights.46 The court declared the most significant state
interest to be that of preserving life.47 It did not suggest, however,
any circumstances under which this interest might have effect in the
presence of contrary desires on the part of the patient. All the court
ventured to say on the matter was that, "[b]alanced against [the pa-
tient's] rights are the interests of the state in the preservation of
life ..... ,"48 The court declined to say how such rights would be bal-
anced, or what circumstances, if any, would tip the scale in favor of
the state.
The court's failure to address these issues raises practical problems
for physicians and attorneys who might rely on Bartling as a guide-
line in the practice of their profession.49 What are the physician's lia-
bilities where he terminates medical treatment at the patient's behest
and only later discovers that the state interest in preserving life was
inappropriately violated? 50 If the state is to have an interest in the
continuing life of a patient, it is necessary to determine the state in-
terest and when it comes into effect. It must be made cognizable, ar-
ticulable and palpable if it is to have a place in the decision-making
process. Guidelines are of obvious importance to medical and legal
practioners. The metes and bounds of the competing state interest
are even more important to the suffering patient because the patient
cannot readily contest an undefined state interest.
D. The Bartling Decision is of Little Help in Future Cases
Even where future cases are identical in the legal sense, Bartling
offers little or no guidance where the facts are dissimilar. The deci-
sion leaves an uncertainty concerning the definition and effect of the
competing state interests, and the rationality of the patient's decision
to end life support defies anything more than circular and inconsis-
46. See supra notes 24 and 30 and accompanying text.
47. 163 Cal. App. 3d at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
48. Id
49. One of the intentions of the Bartling court was to ensure that parties in future
cases would be free to act in accordance with the patient's instructions without prior
court approval. See supra note 28. There is an obvious practical danger created by act-
ing upon the patient's instructions where a contrary, but as yet undetermined, state
interest exists in keeping the patient alive.
50. The obvious answer would seem to be criminal liability, although probably not
for murder. See generally Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 484 (1983) (attending physicians who ordered removal cannot be charged with
murder). In a comparable situation charges were reported dropped against a White
Plains, New York woman who was indicted for performing an abortion on herself dur-
ing her ninth month of pregnancy. 49 Weekly Law Digest, Feb. 22, 1985, at 8e, col. 2.
"This case was said to be 'the first of its kind in New York and possibly the nation.'"
Id,
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tent analysis. Right-to-die cases in the wake of Bartling will there-
fore be hampered with doubt regarding its applicability. Any patient
who is a competent adult and suffering from a serious and probably
incurable illness should arguably be afforded the same preference in
balancing the comleting interests as Mr. Bartling. Further, problems
may arise in determining the rationality of the patient's decision
where the patient is expected to live for more than one year under
continued treatment.5 1 Similar problems may also arise in determin-
ing whether the patient's illness is sufficiently serious and incurable
to justify termination of medical treatment, especially if the treat-
ment sought to be enjoined is relatively less painful and less intrusive
than that in Bartling. 52 The Bartling decision offers sufficient guide-
lines only where the parties are certain that it applies to their case.
Therein lies the problem.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR GUIDELINES: A BALANCING EQUATION
At the outset, it should be stated that the following equations can-
not balance the competing interests in right-to-die cases with mathe-
matical certainty and precision. There are cases where the interests
of the respective parties may differ by merely fractions of a point.
This is not intended to suggest that the processes discussed are sterile
and mathematically objective, free from subjectivity and human com-
passion. Rather, the proposed equations seek merely to take into ac-
count all interests which have been deemed relevant to the inquiry
and, in some cases, additional interests which should be considered
relevant. Attempts are made to assign the respective interests appro-
priate values while allowing, at the same time, for changes in these
values since the circumstances under consideration are subject to
change.
The hypotheses herein are also somewhat subjective. However,
where subjectivity is expressed, an attempt is made to ensure that it
be uniform and sensible. Moreover, subjectivity plays a role only in
assessing the categorical degree of certain interests as low, medium,
or high in importance, and is never used to discount the competing
51. As a patient's life expectancy increases, the rationality of the decision to termi-
nate life-support arguably becomes more questionable. See infra notes 67-70 and ac-
companying text.
52. Where the painfulness and intrusiveness of the treatment decreases, the state's
interest in preserving life increases. At some point, if the state has a genuine and
nonfictional interest, it must eventually outweigh those of the patient. See infra note
66 and accompanying text.
interests involved. The equation as set forth requires values for all
competing interests, and is designed to be as fair as possible after ac-
counting for all such interests.
A. The Basic Equation
On the left side of the equation are the variables which reflect the
interests of the state: namely, the state interest in the preservation of
life53 and the inverse of the degree of intrusion5 4 which the com-
pelled treatment requires. The right side of the equation sets forth
the considerations which are more properly attributed to the inter-
ests of the patient.55 Schematically, the equation is organized as
follows:
(state concerns) (patient's concerns)
Kbalanced against>
More specifically, the left side, representing state concerns, looks like
this:
(state interest) X (1/intrusion) <:*
The first variable denotes the interest of the state in the preserva-
tion of life. This has been determined to be the most significant com-
peting interest in right-to-die cases.56 The value of this variable is
rated on a scale of 1 to 3 (1 = low, 2 = medium, and 3 = maximum).
In most instances the state interest in the preservation of life will be
the maximum value of 3.57 For the purposes of analyzing the compet-
ing interests in right-to-die cases, it is usually prudent and proper to
53. For a discussion of the state interest in preserving life and its common law ori-
gins, see supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
54. "[T]he individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion in-
creases and the prognosis dims." Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. In one case
involving a request for an order directing amputation of both legs, the court held "the
extensive bodily invasion involved ... is sufficient to make the State's interest in the
preservation of life give way to [the patient's] right of privacy . . . regardless of the
absence of a dim prognosis." In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 290, 383 A.2d 785,
789 (Morris County Ct. 1978).
55. "In deciding cases in which a patient's right to die has been asserted, the
courts have almost universally balanced the individual's right to die or to terminate
treatment against the various interests of the state." Comment, Law at the Edge of
Life: Issues of Death and Dying, 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 433, 437 (1984).
56. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. See also Nesbitt, Terminating Life
Support for Mentally Retarded, Critically Ill Patients, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 245 (1982).
"Western society has traditionally placed a nearly absolute value on human life. The
Biblical injunction against the taking of life is reflected in the early common law, and
embodied in the penal code of every state of the Union." Id. at 248 (footnotes omitted).
57. The interest is not, however, absolute. If the life to be preserved is expected to
be long and healthy after treatment, the state's interest is quite compelling. See, e.g.,
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971). How-
ever, if the life to be continued under compelled treatment is expected to be brief,
painful, or extended only by a great degree of bodily intrusion, the state's interest will
be minimal at best. See supra note 41.
Because the equation accounts for these countervailing interests of the patient on an
individual basis, it is appropriate to begin with the assumption that a maximum state
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always assume maximum state interest.58
The second variable affecting the weight of state concerns is the in-
verse of the degree of intrusion required by the life-sustaining treat-
ment. This variable is also valued on a scale of 1 to 3, designating
low, medium and high levels of intrusion, respectively.59 The greater
the intrusion, the lower the value of this variable. Notice that as the
degree of intrusion in treatment increases to the maximum, the value
of the total state concerns approaches 1. The following denotes maxi-
mum state interest in preserving life and minimum intrusion in the
continued treatment:
(state interest in preserving life) X (1/intrusion) <=
(3) x (1/1) = 3 <=
The right side of the equation contains the variables which are
more properly attributed to the patient. These variables are as fol-
lows: 1) the patient's desire to be removed from life support equip-
ment;60 2) the inverse of the number of years which the patient is
expected to live;6 ' 3) the degree of medical certainty that the pa-
tient's condition and prognosis has been accurately diagnosed (where
1.0 equals absolute certainty);62 and 4) the degree of pain and suffer-
ing to which the patient is subjected if the treatment continues un-
checked.63 Schematically, the right side of the equation looks like
interest exists in order to avoid factoring the same interests twice-once on the state's
side of the equation and once on the patient's side.
58. It has been deemed desirable, in close cases, to commit errors "on the side of
life." In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1010 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
59. See supra note 54.
60. This value is maximum, or 3, where the patient is legally competent and has
not wavered in his or her decision. Fear of irrationality in the decision or uncertainty
as to its soundness is minimized by the absence of vacillation. A maximum desire can
also be realized where there is certainty as to the patient's preferences, such as when
the patient is conscious and competent to assert his or her own rights. Adjustments
may be required to reflect "substituted judgment" cases, see infra note 158, or those
cases involving infants or unconscious patients in need of life-saving treatment. See in-
fra notes 165-94 and accompanying text.
61. The inverse of this expectancy is utilized because the right to terminate life is
apt to be recognized where the treatment will merely prolong life rather than preserve
it, especially when the life to be prolonged will be of brief duration. Quinlan, 70 N.J.
at 23-29, 355 A.2d at 655-57; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 737-40, 370 N.E.2d at 423-24;
Eichner, 73 A.D.2d at 468-69, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 545; cf. Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697,
434 N.E.2d 601 (1982) (involving an infant). Of course, the right to refuse life-sus-
taining medical treatment is not an issue where the state recognizes the concept of
brain death. If the patient were brain dead, the number of years of life expectancy
would be zero. See, e.g., Lovato v. District Court, 198 Colo. 419, 601 P.2d 1072 (1979)
(en banc).
62. See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
63. This variable is also rated on a scale of 3, 3 being maximum and 1 being mini-
this:
< (patient's (1/yrs. (degree of (pain &
desire to X expected X medical X suffering)
be removed) to live) certainty)
B. Hypothetical No. 1
A hypothetical application best illustrates how the equation works.
Assuming maximum state interest in preserving the hypothetical pa-
tient's life and that the treatment's intrusion is minimal, the left side
of the equation (state side) will look like this:
(state interest X (1/intrusion) <:
in preserving life)(3) X (1/1) = 3 €
If the hypothetical patient is legally competent and his desire to be
removed from the life-sustaining treatment is maximum,64 he is ex-
pected to live for one year with 80% medical certainty, and if his pain
and suffering are minimal,65 the right side of the equation will look
like this:
< (patient's (1/yrs. (degree of (pain &
desire to X expected X medical X suffering)
be removed) to live) certainty)
or: (3) X (1/1) X (.80) X (1) = 2.4
The entire equation reads:
(3) x (1) = 3 (3) X (1/1) X (.80) x (1)=2.4
3 <: 2.4
RESULT: State interest prevails.
This is logical if the interest of the state in preserving life is to
have any meaning. Where there is minimal state interest, minimal
intrusion and minimal pain and suffering for the patient, the state's
interest should prevail under these circumstances. 66
mum. The Quinlan court recognized a patient's interest in self-determination in the
face of, inter alia, a painful and certain death. 70 N.J. at 43, 355 A.2d at 665. The
death of patients in this context has raised fear among those who oppose euthanasia.
Such fear has been said to be based upon the possible expansion of euthanasia practice
beyond that which is legally conscionable. For example, initial euthanasia legislation
could allow a procedure by which a qualifying patient could request medication that
would cause a swift and painless death. Those who fear euthanasia feel that once the
public has adjusted to this type of extermination, it would then be easier to enact less
restrictive laws that could ultimately lead to the involuntary and active euthanasia of
persons who have become less productive members of society. Kamisar, Some Non-
Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 969,
976 (1958).
64. This is because he is conscious and able to assert his right to die on his own
behalf. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
65. The pain and suffering variable is therefore designated as 1.
66. Where no "heavy physical and emotional burdens" would be imposed, the state
interest in the preservation of life applies with full force. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 744,
370 N.E.2d at 427.
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C. Hypothetical No. 2 - Low Life Expectancy
Where the patient's condition has been diagnosed as terminal, it is
fairly well-settled that the right to refuse treatment is at its height.6 7
But even where there has been no diagnosis of terminal condition, as
in the Bartling case, the state's comparative interest declines along
with the patient's life expectancy. How short must one's life expec-
tancy be before a condition is affirmatively diagnosed as terminal? If
the patient is expected to live only two days, there is little doubt that
the condition is terminal in both the legal and medical sense. But
how should a court treat a case where the patient is almost terminal?
Suppose the patient is expected to live for ten months. This period of
time is short enough to justify a diagnosis of terminal condition, yet
long enough to argue otherwise.6 8
If the foregoing equation is used to balance the interests, a court
would not need to address the difficult question of how short one's
life expectancy must be in order for the condition to be considered
terminal. The equation would instead weigh the interests without
drawing a static line as to what constitutes a condition "terminal"
enough to award preference to the patient's rights. Plugging the
variables into the equation and keeping all facts the same, except the
life expectancy, which becomes nine months instead of one year,
analysis of a second hypothetical patient with a lower life expectancy
leads to different results:
State Concerns Patient's Concerns
(3) x (1/1) = 3 <= (3) x (1/(9/12)) X (.80) X (1)
(3) X (12/9) X (.80) X (1) = 3.2
3 <* 3.2
RESULT: Patient's concerns prevail.
6 9
67. For example, the California Natural Death Act provides in pertinent part:
"The Legislature finds that adult persons have the fundamental right to control the
decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical care, including the decision to
have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a terminal con-
dition." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186 (West Supp. 1985). See also Bartling,
163 Cal. App. 3d at 194 n.5, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224 n.5. For a listing of similar statutes in
other jurisdictions, see supra note 39.
68. "By parity of reasoning, the constitutional right to privacy, we believe, encom-
passes the freedom of the terminally ill but competent individual to choose for himself
whether or not to decline medical treatment where he reasonably believes that such
treatment will only prolong his suffering needlessly .... Eichner v. Dillon, 73
A.D.2d 431, 458-59, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 539 (1980), modified sub nom. In re Storar, 52
N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981). See also infra notes 165-94 involv-
ing infant and newborn patients.
69. Because the equation utilizes the number of years, a nine-month life expec-
The formula thus allows for consideration of a condition approach-
ing the status of "terminal" without drawing a bright line in the
chronological sense. The closer the life expectancy is to zero, the
more the condition becomes "terminal" and the patient's interests
properly become more influential.70 In one instance, a patient might
be considered duly terminal where she is expected to live for nine
months and the other variables are weighty. For example, assume
her treatment is intrusive and painful, and she has a maximum de-
sire to be removed from life support in order that she might die in a
more dignified environment.71 In another case, however, the patient
may require a more "terminal" condition (for example, say a life ex-
pectancy of five months) because his treatment is less painful and
less intrusive,72 and his desire to be removed is less than maximum
because he has wavered in his decision.73 In such a case, the patient's
condition would have to be more grave in order to overcome the com-
peting state interest in preserving life.74
D. The "Medical Certainty" Factor
In carefully examining the foregoing equation, questions no doubt
arise as to the necessity of the "medical certainty" factor.7 5 More-
over, it may be contended that the medical certainty factor is mis-
placed in the present equation. 76 In answering these questions, the
tancy is designated with the fractional equivalent, 9/12. Thus, the inverse becomes "1/
(9/12)" or "12/9."
70. The more terminal the patient's condition, the more futile the life-sustaining
treatment becomes. Thus, the more futile the treatment, the more obvious it is that
"such treatment will only prolong his suffering needlessly. ... Eichner, 73 A.D.2d at
458-59, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 539.
71. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 15-11, at 935 (1978). Tribe de-
fines a dignified environment as one more empathetic: something other than "the
demeaning tangle of technology that has become death's least human face.. . ." Id.
72. Examples of less intrusive treatment usually include those which require less
physical encroachment, such as blood transfusions and narcotic drugs. It should be
noted, however, that bodily intrusion has been deemed significant though no direct
physical contact may be involved in the application of the treatment. See, e.g.,
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 732-35, 370 N.E.2d at 420-22 (chemotherapy treatment).
73. See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
74. Because of the lowered value of the other patient factors, the patient's life ex-
pectancy must be less in order to offset the reduction in value of his total concerns.
75. To reduce the possibility of judgmental error or even personal bias, a second
attending physician's concurrence with the nature of the illness and the prognosis
should be required. The accuracy of diagnosis and prognosis is crucial to such a deci-
sion. Cf In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 51, 355 A.2d 647, 669, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976) (prognosis is focal point in decision to remove life support). Even if the progno-
sis is unclear or uncertain, the obscurity of prognosis is nevertheless an important fac-
tor for the patient, as well as others, to consider.
76. For example, some may argue that the medical certainty factor belongs on the
side with the state's interests, because the more certain the patient's prognosis and
treatabiity, the more concrete the state interest in preserving the patient's life. It
should be noted, however, that the medical certainty factor, although placed on the pa-
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medical certainty variable is factored as it is to discount the gravity of
the patient's interests in cases of uncertain prognosis or treatability.77
Where the status of the patient is uncertain in the medical sense, it
is logical to offset the patient's interest in terminating medical treat-
ment with the hope (or at least the consideration) of developing a
cure or a more effective treatment program.78 This factor allows for
unforeseen and sudden progress in medical science.79 It would in-
deed be retrospectively irrational to have allowed self-destruction
where a cure or progressive treatment is developed soon after the pa-
tient's self-directed death. Furthermore, a stronger medical certainty
as to the patient's condition and prognosis should rightly strengthen
her case for removal from life support.80 The equation affords medi-
cal certainty this effect by factoring it into the analysis. The follow-
ing hypothetical illustrates this effect.
E. Hypothetical No. 3 - Medical Uncertainty in a Younger
Patient
Assume in this case that the patient is about 30 years old and is ex-
pected to live a minimum of six years. He is, however, suffering from
a form of AIDS81 of which little is known, thereby making medical
tient's side, favors the state in cases of uncertainty by mathematically lowering the pa-
tient's total concerns.
77. The equation favors, to a limited extent, life in this instance, despite authority
which has suggested that uncertainty favors the patient. The patient should be free of
"heavy physical and emotional burdens" which would impose "a brief and uncertain
delay in the natural processes of death." Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379
Mass. 255, 263, 399 N.E.2d 452, 456 (1979) (emphasis added) (quoting Saikewicz 373
Mass. at 744, 370 N.E.2d at 427).
78. A more effective treatment plan might involve, for example, less intrusion and
pain or even permit treatment on an out-patient basis. It should not be overlooked
that a cure or improved treatment may be developed during the time within which the
patient is expected to live. Morris, Compelling A Competent Adult to Submit to Medi-
cal Treatment: An Argument Against Antidysthanasia, 16 FORUM 911, 919 (1981).
79. Familiar examples include the recent progress in detecting and treating AIDS,
see infra note 81, and the increasingly routine implantation of artificial hearts.
80. For example, a prognosis may be certain but "dim". See Quinlan, 70 N.J. at
43, 355 A.2d at 665.
81. The Center for Disease Control defines a case of AIDS as "a reliably diagnosed
disease that is at least moderately indicative of an underlying cellular immu-
nodeficiency in a person who has had no known underlying cause of cellular immu-
nodeficiency nor any other cause of reduced resistance reported to be associated with
that disease." Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Update - United
States, 32 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP.
309, 309-10 (1983). See generally Comment, AIDS: A Legal Epidemic?, 17 AKRON L.
REV. 717 (1984) (dealing exclusively with the disease and its impact on the legal
profession).
certainty of his prognosis and treatability a low 60%. Assume further
that his desire to be removed from life support is maximum because
of the intense pain and suffering caused by his affliction. The degree
of intrusion required for his continued treatment is maximum be-
cause of the severity of his condition.8 2 He suffers from acute pain
and discomfort and wishes to be removed immediately to allow the
processes of nature to take their course; he states that he would
rather die naturally than live an extremely painful and uncertain life
in the hospital. In these circumstances, what would be the result?
Would the state have the power to compel his continued treatment
and subject him to a painful and uncertain existence? Plugging the
foregoing values into the formula produces the following results:
State Concerns Patient's Concerns
(3) x (1/3) = 1 <: (3) x (1/6) x (.60) X (3) = .9
1 <:. .9
RESULT: State concerns prevail.
Under the foregoing analysis the state seems to indeed have the
power, in the form of prevailing interests, to compel this unfortunate
patient to continue treatment and live, in essence, a life of pain and
agony against his will. This speaks rather poorly of the equation's vi-
ability in handling such cases, since it does not seem conscionable to
subject a competent adult patient to such wretchedness. This result
may not differ markedly from others reached under present law.8 3
Such congruity notwithstanding, the instant results should be con-
sidered unacceptable. Aside from the legal and constitutional ques-
tions, it seems inherently wrong to subject a competent human being
to a prolonged and painful existence against his will merely because
it is medically possible to cure the terminal condition and because the
state has some inarticulable interest in preserving life. A more palat-
able approach would hopefully give more consideration to the com-
fort and well-being of the individual patient. 84 For this reason, the
foregoing equation is in need of another variable to account for such
situations. This variable is designed to provide more consideration to
82. The degree of intrusion therefore is assigned a value of 3. Indeed, it has been
argued that nontreatment may be "good medical practice." Robertson, Involuntary
Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 213, 214 (1975).
83. For one commentator's model favoring treatment under analogous circum-
stances, see Morris, supra note 78, at 919-20.
For this patient, death is inevitable but not imminent. He is not confronted
with an emergency situation where a decision must be made immediately as to
whether he is to live or die. With no treatment he may live twelve more
months; with it his life may be prolonged as much as five years.
Id. at 919. Thus, in this instance, Morris suggests that a court compel treatment
through an appointed guardian. Id. at 920.
84. "[T]he prevailing ethical practice seems to be to recognize that the dying are
more often in need of comfort than treatment." Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743, 370 N.E.2d
at 426.
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the patient where his existence is painful, uncertain, and significantly
impaired.
F The Life Quality Factor
The needs of patients who find themselves in these unfortunate
circumstances are addressed by the introduction of a factor which de-
notes a change in the quality of the patient's life.85 This factor is to
be rated on a scale of one to zero and is dropped from the analysis
completely where the value is zero in order to preserve the mathe-
matical integrity of the multiplicative equation.86 Such a factor
might initially seem too subjective and pro-patient to have any mean-
ing in an equation which purports to objectively weigh the interests
of all concerned. However, one must keep in mind that such a factor
represents only one small part of the patient's concerns and consti-
tutes only one of many variables in the equation. Viewed in this
light, such a factor should appropriately serve its purpose without
sacrificing any analytical integrity in the long-run.
A "quality of life" factor necessarily requires a determination as to
how the patient has been affected by his infirmity. Even though such
determinations may at times require philosophical inquiries, they
should not be shunned on that basis. The law should indeed be con-
cerned with how the patient has been affected in these cases. If no
consideration is given to the patient's life quality for fear of philo-
sophical inquiries, we do suffering patients a great injustice.8 7 More-
over, fear of life quality assessments may often be "knee-jerk"
reactions to the mere idea of deciding these issues using life quality
as a yardstick. As a humane society, we have been prone to protect
and preserve life regardless of its quality as a matter of government
85. For a discussion of the interest of the patient in the quality of life, see Dubos,
The State of Health and the Quality of Life, 125 W.J. MED. 8 (1976):
[Medicine cannot by itself determine the quality of life. It can only help peo-
ple to achieve the state of health that enables them to cultivate the art of
life-but in their own way. This implies the ability to enjoy the fundamental
satisfactions of the biological joie de vivre. It implies also the ability for each
person to do what he wants to do and become what he wants to become, ac-
cording to human values that transcend medical judgment.
Id, at 9. At least one court has stated, "account is to be taken of the prognosis and of
the magnitude of the proposed invasion." In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 634, 405 N.E.2d
115, 119 (1980). See also Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 735, 754, 370 N.E.2d at 422, 432.
86. It is inconceivable that the patient's interests, under any circumstances, would
amount to zero.
87. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
policy.SS This is, of course, proper from the state's point of view. It
would certainly consummate many an Orwellian fear should the gov-
ernment begin dabbling in these and other life-support decisions
from a standpoint of quality assessment.8 9
The quality of life is, of course, in the eyes of the beholder. 90 The
quality factor contained in the equation merely accounts for objective
and rational9' reductions from the point of view of the beholder (the
patient) with sufficient safeguards to avoid irrational or improperly
attributed decision-making. 92 The equation neither permits nor re-
quires the state to indulge in quality inquiries, nor does it require the
patient to do so where such analysis is irrelevant or defies calcula-
tion.93 This factor simply attempts to compensate for those situations
where the overriding state interests would otherwise compel a pa-
tient to live a painful and vexatious life. The patient's existence
should not be compelled by the state without some showing that the
life sustained will be a worthwhile one. It would seem otherwise un-
just to compel continued and involuntary suffering without some evi-
dence that the life being artificially and forcefully preserved is
meaningful enough to justify the invasion of privacy.
The salient question arises, then, as to what analysis may be used
to determine a change in the quality of one's life. Some suggested
88. See Saikewic-, 373 Mass. at 754, 370 N.E.2d at 432. "To the extent that this for-
mulation equates the value of life with any measure of the quality of life, we firmly
reject it." Id.
89. Some commentators have expressed fear that decisions concerning life quality
would place the state on a tightrope where protection of life depends on judgments of
social utility. Robertson, supra note 82, at 256; see also Note, The Refusal of Life-Sav-
ing Medical Treatment vs. the State's Interest in the Preservation of Life: A Clarifica-
tion of the Interests at Stake, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 85, 106-07 (1980); 1974 Hearings, supra
note 11, at 7.
90. "[This] concept is just one expression of the basic tenet that, 'outside areas of
plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape his own life as he thinks best,
do what he pleases, go where he pleases.'" Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038, 1048
n.33 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958)).
91. "[W]hen danger to health exists ... state regulation shall be tested under the
rational basis standard." People v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 703, 591 P.2d 919, 922, 153
Cal. Rptr. 431, 434, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
163 (1973)) (emphasis in original). Contra Andrews, 498 F. Supp. at 1050 n.36. For a
different perspective, see President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d at
1017 (Burger, J., dissenting):
Nothing in this utterance suggests that Justice Brandeis thought an individual
possessed these rights only as to sensible beliefs, valid thoughts, reasonable
emotions, or well-founded sensations. I suggest he intended to include a great
many foolish, unreasonable and even absurd ideas which do not conform, such
as refusing medical treatment even at great risk.
Id. (emphasis in original).
92. For example, if the proposed treatment were painless and unintrusive, it
would typically be considered irrational for the patient to wish to die when the costs of
preserving his life are so minimal.
93. Compelling blood transfusions, for example, would require little, if any,
change in the life quality factor. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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factors are: reductions in functionability; 94 a diminished capacity for
enjoyment; diminished capacity for the patient to enjoy human rela-
tionships;95 chronic emotional maladjustment; diminution in physical
or cognitive sensation;96 and other similar losses borrowed from tort
law. 97
G. Hypothetical No. 4 - Utilizing the Life Quality Factor
Taking the same example used in Hypothetical No. 3, we will now
factor in the Life Quality variable. Before including the life quality
factor, the equation looked like this:
State Concerns Patient's Concerns
(3) X (1/3) = 1 <: (3) x (1/6) x (.60) x (3) = .9
1 <: .9
Assume for this example that the quality of the patient's life is es-
sentially unchanged. Since pain and suffering are already factored
into the equation, they will not have a bearing on the life quality fac-
tor, especially where the bodily functions of our patient (with the ex-
ception of his immune system) are intact. He enjoys full cognitive
and physical awareness and has the capacity for full movement.
Aside from his painful condition, assume that his life quality has
changed very little, perhaps reduced by only 10%. Restating this in
terms suitable for use in the equation, our hypothetical patient's life
quality is 90% of what it was before the advent of the terminal condi-
tion.98 The life quality factor is the inverse of the degree of the pa-
94. One commentator has suggested that there is no justification "for coercive in-
trusion by the state in those life-or-death situations. . . in which. .. there is less than
a high probability that the nonexperimental treatment will enable the [patient] to pur-
sue either a life worth living or a life of relatively normal healthy growth ....
Goldstein, supra note 11, at 653.
95. McCormick, To Save or Let Die, The Dilemma of Modern Medicine, 229 J.
A.M.A. 172, 175 (1974).
96. Some life-preserving treatments which can lead to, or aggravate physical
handicaps and impair mental development have been criticized as unjustifiable. See,
e.g., In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied 445 U.S.
949 (1980); In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
97. See, e.g., Personal Injury Desk Book 1984 774-80 (J. Nates & D. Axelrod eds.
1984) (cases involving wrongful life); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 (1977)
(nonpecuniary damages related to personal injury); McAlister v. Carl, 233 Md. 446, 197
A.2d 140 (1964) (personal injury action involving mental suffering and nonpecuniary
harm); Hogan v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 148 Kan. 720, 85 P.2d 28 (1938) (loss of enjoy-
ment where injuries rendered plaintiff unable to continue playing the violin).
98. Assume his life quality has been diminished by 10% due to the restrictions and
inconveniences caused by his treatment, and that his activities are curtailed because of
the painfulness of his condition.
tient's life quality. In this hypothetical, that value would be (1/.90).
The revised equation looks like this:
State Concerns Patient's Concerns
(3) x (1/3) :, (3) X (1/6) X (.60) X (3) X (1/.90)
= 1 <* =.99
RESULT: State concerns still prevail.
However, if this patient's life quality is instead diminished to 50%
of what it once was, the result is appropriately different:
State Concerns Patient's Concerns
(3) X (1/3) <* (3) X (1/6) X (.60) X (3) X (1/.50)
= 1 <: = 1.80
RESULT: Patient's concerns prevail.
H. Handling Cases Involving Long Life Expectancy
One of the most obvious contingencies in the foregoing hypotheti-
cals is the state interest in cases involving long life expectancy. The
equation utilizes the inverse of the patient's life expectancy; the
longer the patient is expected to live, the lower the value of his total
concerns, or the greater the state interest. This is logical if the state's
true interest is in fact that of preserving life.
Practical problems arise, however, because a long life expectancy
could conceivably thwart all of the other factors weighing on the pa-
tient's behalf. All other factors being equal, the young age of particu-
lar patients and the unusual circumstances surrounding their
condition could combine to discriminate against them on the basis of
age. We have laws prohibiting age discrimination in such mundane
affairs as employment. Therefore, it is presumably undesirable to
discriminate in the exercise of an important constitutional right on
the basis of age.99 The following hypothetical is illustrative.
. Hypothetical No. 5 - Long Life Expectancy and Ineffective
Treatment
For purposes of this example, assume that the patient is 24 years
old and expected to live for 40 more years. Assume also that the
prognosis and treatability of his condition are certain, and the rele-
99. For example, discriminatory treatment of disabled newborns is prohibited by
federal law. In 1983, President Reagan's memorandum to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (HHS) cited a Baby Doe case and noted that discrimination against
the handicapped is illegal. In response, HHS issued regulations that would terminate
federal funds to health care providers who refuse to treat handicapped infants. 48 Fed.
Reg. 9,630 (1983). Since then, however, one court has nullified this action, finding that
HHS regulations were promulgated in an arbitrary and capricious manner in violation
of federal statutory law. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395
(D.D.C. 1983). Since this nullification, the government has expressed its continuing
desire to take action pursuant to the regulations. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (1984) (revision
of HHS Regulations).
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vant medical certainty factor is 90%. The patient is competent and
suffering greatly; his desire to be removed from life support is maxi-
mum due to the painful and miserable future which awaits him. In
short, this unfortunate patient has everything in the equation, except
his age, working in favor of his desire to die. The life quality factor is
a low 40% because his affliction has been grave and debilitating, and
treatment is highly intrusive and painful. Because of his unusually
lengthy life expectancy, however, his interests will be overshadowed
by those of the state:
State Concerns Patient's Concerns
(3) X (1/3) <:> (3) X (1/40) x (.90) x (3) X (1/.40)
= 1 t* =.5
RESULT: State interest prevails.
This analysis seems to present a clear case of age discrimination. If
the patient were expected to live for a shorter time and all other
variables remained unchanged, the patient's interests would pre-
vail.100 It is sensible that an increased life expectancy results in an
enhanced state interest.' 0 ' However, the equation as presently struc-
tured appears to ignore the plight of this isolated class of young
patients.
There is no conscionable reason why the suffering of younger or
more uniquely afflicted 02 patients should be discounted under other-
wise identical circumstances. It has been suggested that one of the
100. See supra Hypothetical No. 4, wherein the patient's interest prevails despite a
six-year life expectancy.
101. When the patient is terminal, neither his family nor the state should be con-
cerned with the hopelessly elusive question of whether life is worth living. It is
enough merely to concede that an individual need not prolong the dying process. P.
RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE: MEDICAL AND LEGAL INTERSECTIONS 1-14
(1978). On the other hand, when a nonterminal but chronically ill, debilitated, or co-
matose patient is involved, the question of removal requires society to either struggle
with insoluble problems of statutory drafting, or remove all legal prohibition of sui-
cide, or assisting in suicide, when the affected individual or his family concludes that
life is no longer worth living. The former alternative logically leads to repugnant ad-
vice concerning the lives of several hundred thousand retarded persons. The latter dis-
plays a conspicuous insensitivity to the plight of depressed or mentally disturbed
persons. Sherlock, For Everything There is a Season: The Right to Die in the United
States, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 545, 560 (1982). The result of this dilemma is that the state
interest in preserving life increases along with the patient's life expectancy. This is
due to overzealous application and the fear of consequential totalitarian overtones
which accompany removal of nonterminal patients from life support. See supra note
63 and accompanying text.
102. For example, older patients who have longer life expectancies because of their
debilitated but nonterminal condition could be grouped in the same class as younger
patients.
state's concerns in right-to-die cases is that of preventing irrational
self-destruction.103 Thus, if there is evidence accrued over a substan-
tial time period that the patient's decision is a rational one, we might
be more inclined to prioritize his decision even though he is expected
to live a long life. This is especially true where the patient is failing
to adjust to his condition and there is little hope for his physical and
psychological recovery.104
Suppose the same patient in Hypothetical No. 5 above remains
physically and psychologically unchanged after two years of com-
pelled life-sustaining treatment. Is it sensible to continue his com-
pelled treatment for a possible thirty-eight more years? Would we
not be satisfied after two years of no psychological or physical adjust-
ment to the treatment that the patient's continued desire to die is a
competent decision and not one attributable to mere depression or
emotional devastation over his condition?105 Assume we have waited
two years for adjustment, for signs of psychological recovery, 106 and
for evidence of an improperly attributed decision regarding his re-
quest for removal from life-support. We have, in essence, waited for
signs of irrationality, but there appear to be none. The patient has
been given every opportunity during this time to adjust, recover, and
learn to deal with his handicap. If the patient again requests re-
moval, it makes no sense to deny his request and in effect sentence
him to thirty-eight more years of unwanted life-support.
If such disturbing results are to be avoided, the equation should be
adjusted to handle analogous situations. A factor is needed, at the pa-
tient's option, which accounts for the patient's failure to overcome
the devastation of his condition. It is manifestly unjust to continue
life-support against the patient's wishes for such extensive periods of
time where there is no longer a reasonable fear that the decision to
103. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
104. For a moving literary treatment of a case such as this, see B. CLARK, WHOSE
LIFE IS IT ANYWAY? (1980) (involving the plight of a sculptor who became totally para-
lyzed during middle age as the result of an accident).
105. See, e.g., In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C. 619 (1973).
In our opinion, the constitutional right of privacy includes the right of a ma-
ture competent adult to refuse to accept medical recommendations that may
prolong one's life and which, to a third person at least, appear to be in his best
interests; in short, that the right of privacy includes a right to die with which
the State should not interfere where there are no minor or unborn children
and no clear and present danger to public health, welfare or morals. If the
person was competent while being presented with the decision and in making
the decision which she did, the court should not interfere even though her de-
cision might be considered unwise, foolish or ridiculous.
IM at 623 (footnote omitted).
106. See E. KUBLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND DYING 38-147 (1969). Kubler-Ross sepa-
rates the patient's reactions to and handling of death into five stages: 1) denial and
isolation; 2) anger; 3) bargaining; 4) depression; and 5) acceptance. Application of this
information may help in deciding when to allow patients self-determination.
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discontinue treatment is a hasty one, or brought about by depression,
shock, or temporary emotional despondency. i 07 Therefore, a new op-
tional factor termed the "adjustment potential" variable will be uti-
lized in the equation. This variable will be the inverse of the
likelihood of the patient's future adjustment, where 1.0 represents
maximum adjustment potential. i 08 The variable's value could possi-
bly be determined in the early stages of treatment by statistical in-
quiries.'0 9 This has the effect of raising a presumption in favor of
adjustment in the early stages of treatment. Indeed, there are nu-
merous cases in which individuals have overcome tremendous handi-
caps and debilitative conditions to lead productive, rewarding, and
well-adjusted lives.'1 0
Because of the encouraging examples set by handicapped persons
and the typically unconquerable human spirit, it would be difficult
not to hope for the best in the beginning and anticipate the patient's
ultimate adjustment to the treatment. There may be cases, however,
where the available medical information indicates an extremely poor
likelihood of adjustment,"' and statistical data corroborate a low
likelihood of the patient's adjustment or recovery. It may then be ac-
ceptable to introduce a factor into the equation to account for low
"adjustment potential" at the condition's outset." 2 Otherwise, it
would rarely be appropriate to deviate from an initial presumption of
high adjustment potential.
J. Hypothetical No. 6- Patient's Potential for Adjustment
State Concerns Patient's Concerns
(3) x (1/3) <* (3) X (1/40) X (.90) X (1/.40) X (1/adjustment potential)
107. Decisions attributed to temporary conditions such as shock, depression, or de-
spondency would properly be deemed irrational under existing law and public policy.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
108. As the likelihood of the patient's adjustment increases, the state's interest in
preserving life should increase commensurably. An adjusted patient is more likely, if
not certain, to live a more meaningful life than an unadjusted patient.
109. Using records and prior case histories, for example, the likelihood of recovery
for a similarly-situated patient could be determined by comparison studies. Prior
analogous case histories would show the patients' recovery and adjustment patterns.
110. See, e.g., R. JONES, THE ACORN PEOPLE (1976) (a true story about handicapped
children and their short-lived but rewarding relationship with a camp counselor).
111. Cancer of the esophagus, for example, has yet to be treated successfully.
There are no case histories which document any successful remissions of this disease.
See Gilbert, O'Connell, Kagan, Rao & Potyk, The Management of Cancer of the Tho-
racic Esophagus, in CONTROVERSIES IN CANCER TREATMENT 86 (T. O'Connell ed. 1981).
112. See, e.g., id. at 86-96 (patients diagnosed as suffering from esophageal carci-
noma almost invariably die within one year after discovery of the condition).
Assume that the patient is in the initial stages of treatment, and is
therefore presumed to have a high likelihood of adjustment. For
purposes of this hypothetical, an "adjustment potential" factor of
80% is used as follows:
(3) x (1/3) €* (3) x (1/40) x (.90) x (3) x (1/.40) x (11.80)
- 1 
€ .5 x 10/8
1 < = .625
RESULT: State concerns prevail.
The adjustment potential is high enough in this example to war-
rant the state interest in preserving life taking priority over the con-
trary wishes of the patient. With a high adjustment potential, there
is a compelling likelihood that the patient will adjust and eventually
assimilate into a handicapped but meaningful life.
Suppose, however, that after two years of life-sustaining treatment
the patient has shown no signs of adjustment, psychological assimila-
tion, or any other signs of accepting his condition. He steadfastly per-
sists in his requests to be removed from treatment, and shows
continual signs of despondency. He frequently displays destructive or
misanthropic behavior to the point of requiring physical restraint for
his own protection as well as for the protection of others. Perhaps
this example is unduly dramatic. It is not, however, inconceivable, by
any means.113
The problem faced at this point is determining the desirability of
compelled life-support for such a patient. Despite his initially high
"adjustment potential," our hypothetical patient has clearly demon-
strated a reduced potential for adjustment and an unrelenting desire
to be removed from treatment. His life expectancy is, of course, now
only thirty-eight years, because two years have passed. It may be
helpful to reevaluate the competing interests using an appropriately
reduced adjustment factor of 50%. As the likelihood of recovery ap-
proaches a mere 50-50 chance, the patient's concerns strengthen in
value and eventually prioritize his choice over the now misguided
state interest in preserving life.
State Concerns Patient's Concerns
(3) x (1/3) <* (3) X (1/38) x (.90) x (3) x (11.40) x (11.50)
= 1 €' =.533 x 1/.50
=1 €. =1.066
RESULT: Patient's concerns prevail.
It is an extremely close case, but the result favors the patient in
113. On several occasions in April, Mr. Bartling tried to remove the ventilator
tubes. To prevent accidental or deliberate disconnection of the ventilator
tubes (or any of the other tubes to which he was attached), Mr. Bartling's
wrists were placed in "soft restraints." Despite requests from both Mr. and
Mrs. Bartling, Glendale Adventist and Mr. Bartling's treating physicians re-
fused to remove the ventilator or the restraints.
Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 190, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
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this instance because he has shown no signs of adjustment over a
two-year period. In such circumstances, the moral hazard of irra-
tional self-destruction, or self-destruction attributable to temporary
psychological distress, is minimized.11 4
114. In such cases, it might be difficult to distinguish between protected beliefs,
which are nonetheless "foolish, unreasonable and even absurd .... " President and
Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d at 1017 (Burger, J., dissenting), and unpro-
tected, "irrational self-destruction." Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d at 426
n.11. In making this distinction, the personal importance of the treatment, or non-
treatment, should be attenuated.
It is the individual making the decision, and no one else, who lives with the
pain and disease. It is the individual making the decision, and no one else,
who must undergo or forego the treatment. And it is the individual making
the decision, and no one else, who, if he or she survives, must live with the
results of that decision. One's health is a uniquely personal possession. The
decision of how to treat that possession is of a no less personal nature.
Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038, 1047 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
Perhaps the only judicious method for making such a determination is one which
prevents self-destruction as the result of a temporary or reversible state of mind. Af-
ter the temporariness of the patient's decision has been refuted, there is a danger of
encroachment upon constitutionally protected privacy rights which uphold the pa-
tient's decisions regarding treatment, whether or not it appears to be in his or her best
interest. See supra note 105.
The equation therefore favors, after sufficient time for reflection and adjustment
has passed, the privacy interests of the patient where it appears that the patient genu-
inely desires to be removed from treatment despite the consequence of death. A pas-
sage from B. CLARK, supra note 104, at 141-42, aptly summarizes this point:
KEN
The cruelty doesn't reside in saving someone or allowing them to die. It re-
sides in the fact that the choice is removed from the man concerned.
JUDGE
But a man who is very desperately depressed is not capable of making a rea-
sonable choice.
KEN
As you said, my Lord, that is the question to be decided.
JUDGE
All right. You tell me why it is a reasonable choice that you decided to die.
KEN
It is a question of dignity. Look at me here. I can do nothing, not even the
basic primitive functions. I cannot even urinate, I have a permanent catheter
attached to me. Every few days my bowels are washed out. Every few hours
two nurses have to turn me over or I would rot away from bedsores. Only my
brain functions unimpaired but even that is futile because I can't act on any
conclusions it comes to. This hearing proves that. Will you please listen.
JUDGE
I am listening.
KEN
I choose to acknowledge the fact that I am in fact dead and I find the hospi-
tal's persistent effort to maintain this shadow of life an indignity and it's
inhumane.
JUDGE
But wouldn't you agree that many people with appalling physical handicaps
have overcome them and lived essentially creative, dignified lives?
KEN
V. PROBLEM AREAS IN IMPLEMENTATION
A. Agency for the Comatose and Incompetent
Although brain death statutes have solved several problems that
existed under traditional handling of comatose and brain dead pa-
tients by redefining "death," problems still remain. Some statutes al-
low a physician to choose the definition of death he prefers or
considers appropriate under the circumstances. 1 5 Other statutes pro-
vide that death will be determined by the cessation of brain activity
where a patient's cardiac and respiratory functions are artificially
maintained.116 Under other statutes, cessation of both the cardiac
and respiratory functions remain the determining factors."i7 Still
other statutes provide that the patient is legally dead upon the total
and irreversible cessation of brain function."l8
Twenty states presently do not have statutory definitions of death.
In the absence of such legislation, physicians are apt to apply their
own definitions of death on an ad hoc basis or attempt to anticipate
the courts' definition. Moreover, existing brain death statutes do not
adequately define death. Under all current statutes, a patient may be
legally considered "alive" and yet have brain damage so severe that
he exists without perception, consciousness, or emotion. To compen-
sate for the inadequacies and uncertainties which still exist in the
law, such patients are increasingly being forced to assert the right to
die through their guardians.
A guardian may, in some instances, assert the right to die on the
patient's behalf.119 The problem which arises is determining under
Yes, I would, but the dignity starts with their choice. If I choose to live, it
would be appalling if society killed me. If I choose to die, it is equally appal-
ling if society keeps me alive.
115. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West Supp. 1985); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 12-36-136 (Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-16 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 54-1819
(Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-205 (1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2811
(Supp. 1984); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 5-202 (Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-
36-3 (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (1978); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-323 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 146.001 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4-16
(Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-501 (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5218 (Supp.
1984); VA. CODE § 54-325.7 (1982); WIs. STAT ANN. § 146.71 (West Supp. 1984).
116. ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 (1984); ALAsKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 382.085 (West Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 702.8 (West 1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:111 (West Supp. 1985); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.1021 (West 1980); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 194.005 (Vernon 1983); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447t (Vernon Supp.
1985).
117. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-537 (Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-301(g)
(West 1984).
118. NEV. REV. STAT. § 451.007 (1983); W. VA. CODE § 16-10-2 (1985); Wyo. STAT.
§ 35-19-101 (Supp. 1985).
119. See Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664 ("[w]e have concluded that Karen's
right of privacy may be asserted on her behalf by her guardian under the peculiar cir-
cumstances here present."); but cf Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 757, 370 N.E.2d at 433 (the
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what circumstances such agency may be effective in asserting the pa-
tient's right. The same concerns arising where a competent individ-
ual is asserting the right for himself are even more important in
cases involving assertion through an agent or guardian. The guardian
cases certainly create a moral hazard,120 as well as a justifiable doubt
regarding the certainty of a decision made for, rather than by, the pa-
tient. Is the decision to terminate treatment attributable to the pa-
tient's wishes or to the wishes of the agent? Is the decision simply
attributable to the vegetative condition of the patient? May the deci-
sion be justified by the fact that the patient is unable to enjoy a con-
scious and sapient life?
B. The Guardian Cases
It is probably easiest to understand the issues involved in the asser-
tion of the right to die through a guardian in the context of specific
cases. Although there have been a number of cases dealing with an
individual's right to terminate treatment, three deserve special con-
sideration. In re Quinlan121 and Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewiczl22 have established the foundation upon
which most courts base their decisions in dealing with cases in this
area. Consideration will also be given to Barber v. Superior Court, 123
in which, for the first time, attending physicians were charged with
murder for disconnecting the life-support of a patient in a persistent
and chronic coma.124
1. The Quinlan Case
Karen Quinlan suffered from a condition which was diagnosed as
chronic, persistent, and vegetative. Doctors conceded from the begin-
ning that no cure existed for Karen Quinlan, and that she would
never be restored to a conscious state. She could not, however, be le-
guardian has the responsibility to present to the judge "all reasonable arguments in
favor of administering treatment to prolong the life of the individual involved.").
120. Absent medical agreement about what treatment is indicated, or absent a
societal consensus about the rightness of the predicted result of treatment,
there would be no justification for disqualifying parents from (or for qualify-
ing agents of the state for) making the difficult choice .... Put somewhat
more starkly, how can parents in such situations give the wrong answer since
there is no way of knowing the right answer?
Goldstein, supra note 11, at 654-55.
121. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
122. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
123. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
124. American Medical News, Sept. 16, 1983, at 13.
gaily declared dead.125
On the basis of this prognosis, Karen's father petitioned the New
Jersey Superior Court to have himself appointed as Karen's guardian
and to allow him to authorize the termination of all extraordinary
medical procedures sustaining her life. He also requested the court
to grant immunity from criminal prosecution to anyone effectuating
the termination of treatment.126 The trial court denied the relief
sought and the case was appealed.
Because Karen could not exercise her own right to die, the appel-
late court was confronted with the issue of whether such a right
could be implemented by a guardian on behalf of an incompetent pa-
tient. Reasoning that a patient in such a state would otherwise be in-
capable of exercising this fundamental right, the court held that a
guardian could assert the right to die for an incompetent patient. 127
The guardian may assert this right, however, only where it is shown
that the patient would choose to exercise the right to terminate treat-
ment under the particular facts presented by the patient's condi-
tion.128 The court also noted that the state's interest in preserving
life and the right of a physician to administer medical treatment in
accordance with his best judgment were to be weighed against
Karen's right to die.
The court determined that the state's interest weakens and the in-
dividual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily intrusion in-
creases and the prognosis dims.129 Because Karen's prognosis was
dismal and the bodily invasions by intravenous tubes, antibiotics, and
a respirator were great, the court held that Karen's right to privacy
outweighed the state interest.i3 0
The Quinlan court also reached the issue of whether anyone who
disconnected Karen's respirator would be subject to criminal liability
for homicide. Although the court acknowledged that the termination
of treatment would accelerate Karen's death, it nevertheless held the
act would not constitute criminal homicide because the ensuing death
would not have resulted from anything other than "existing natural
causes."'' Furthermore, even if the death were to be regarded as a
homicide, it would not be unlawful because the exercise of a constitu-
tional right is protected from criminal prosecution. 3 2 This "constitu-
125. She apparently did not meet the necessary legal criteria to be declared dead
under operative law at the time. See Quinlan4 70 N.J. at 20, 355 A.2d at 652.
126. In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 236, 348 A.2d 801, 806 (1975), modijied, 70
N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
127. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976).
128. Id
129. Id. at 40-41, 355 A.2d at 663-64.
130. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
131. Id at 51, 355 A.2d at 669-70.
132. 1& at 52, 355 A.2d at 670. See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969).
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tional protection extends to third parties whose action is necessary to
effectuate the exercise of that right. . "133
2. The Saikewicz Case
Joseph Saikewicz was a 67-year-old severely retarded man suffer-
ing from incurable and terminal acute leukemia. Doctors prescribed
chemotherapy treatment, but it offered little or no hope of a cure.
Moreover, the treatment would produce significant adverse side ef-
fects and discomfort while providing only a slight chance of remis-
sion. Patients in similar situations generally chose to suffer those
side effects in hope of a remission, rather than let the disease go
untreated.134
Upon the suggestion of the attending physicians, a petition was
filed with the Massachusetts Probate Court for appointment of a
guardian to make decisions regarding Mr. Saikewicz's treatment.
The appointed guardian requested that no treatment be prescribed
for Mr. Saikewicz. 3 5 The probate court agreed with the guardian's
reasoning that the inability of Mr. Saikewicz to "understand that
treatment to which he would be subjected and the fear and pain he
would suffer as a result, outweighed the limited prospect of any ben-
efit from such treatment. ... "136 The court then applied for direct
appellate review by the Massachusetts Supreme Court.137
The Saikewicz opinion, like Quinlan, recognized the substantive
right of both competent and incompetent persons to decline potential
life-prolonging treatment.138 A guardian would therefore have capac-
ity to assert such rights on behalf of patients unable to do so for
themselves. Both courts found the state interests failed to outweigh
the patient's right to privacy.' 3 9 The only state interest found appli-
cable by the Saikewicz court was the preservation of human life.140
The court concluded, however, that this interest could be given little
priority in light of Mr. Saikewicz' dismal medical prognosis.141
133. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 52, 355 A.2d at 670.
134. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 733-34, 370 N.E.2d at 421.
135. Id. at 730, 370 N.E.2d at 419.
136. Id.
137. As did Francis Bartling, see supra note 3 and accompanying text, Joseph
Saikewicz died prior to the hearing before the high court. 373 Mass. at 735, 370 N.E.2d
at 422.
138. Id. at 740, 370 N.E.2d at 424. The rights determined to be applicable to the deci-
sion to decline treatment were the individual privacy rights of the patient.
139. Id. See also Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 39, 355 A.2d at 647.
140. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 744, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
141. Id
Upon determining that patients such as Mr. Saikewicz have the
right to decline treatment, the court adopted a "substituted judg-
ment" rule142 to decide how a legally incompetent patient would ex-
ercise his right to die.143 Courts would determine whether a patient
could exercise the right to die through an evaluation of the patient's
"actual interests and preferences."144
3. The Barber Case
In August, 1981, Clarence Herbert suffered a cardiopulmonary
arrest following the completion of routine surgery. Although he was
immediately placed on life-support, his physicians determined that
Mr. Herbert had suffered severe brain damage due to lack of a nor-
mal oxygenated blood flow to the brain, and that he was in a deep
comatose state likely to be permanent. After learning of Mr. Her-
bert's condition and his slim chances of recovery, his family drafted a
request that the hospital remove all life-sustaining machines. Their
letter indicated that no one carrying out their request would be held
liable.145
Despite recommendations to first seek legal advice, Doctors Barber
and Nejdl removed the respirator approximately seventy-two hours
after Mr. Herbert's cardiopulmonary arrest. The patient continued to
breathe without the assistance of the respirator, but there were no
signs that his condition would improve. After further consultation
with the Herbert family, the doctors ordered the removal of the in-
travenous tubes which provided the patient with hydration and nour-
ishment.146 Eleven days after entering a coma, Mr. Herbert died.
Doctors Barber and Nejdl were subsequently charged by the State
of California with murder and conspiracy to commit murder. The su-
perior court found the charges to be supported by evidence that the
doctors' conduct had shortened Mr. Herbert's life, "since everyone,
sooner or later will die, homicide is simply the shortening of life by
some measurable period of time."147 Therefore, because the physi-
cians' "intentional conduct, which shortened Mr. Herbert's life, was
not authorized by law, it constituted murder."1 48 The California
Court of Appeal ultimately dismissed the complaint against the
physicians.
The appellate court first addressed California's Natural Death
142. Id. at 751-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431-32.
143. Id. at 752, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
144. Id.
145. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 486
(1983).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1012, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
148. Id
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Act,149 which provides that an adult may execute, in advance of ter-
minal illness, a directive for withholding or withdrawing life-sus-
taining treatment in the event he or she later becomes terminally
ill.150 The trial court had reasoned that because of the availability of
such a procedure, and because Mr. Herbert had not executed a direc-
tive to this effect, the family's request for termination was a nullity
and the physicians therefore acted unlawfully.151 In rejecting this
reasoning, the appellate court noted that the procedure provided in
the statute was not intended to impair or supersede the legal right to
withdraw life-support equipment.152
Having found that the patient had the recognized statutory right to
refuse treatment, the court had only to determine whether the physi-
cians' actions were unlawful. The court concluded that disconnecting
the intravenous devices was no different than withholding a manual
injection and, therefore, the disconnection was an omission rather
than an affirmative act.153 The court consequently determined that
the case ultimately turned on whether Doctors Barber and Nejdl had
a duty to provide continuous life-sustaining treatment.154
The three-judge panel concluded that "[a]lthough there may be a
duty to provide life-sustaining machinery in the immediate after-
math of cardio respiratory arrest, there is no duty to continue its use
once it has become futile in the opinion of qualified medical person-
nel."155 In determining the futility of treatment, the court proposed
a balancing test to weigh the benefits of continued treatment against
the hopelessness of the patient's prognosis. Because Mr. Herbert had
a hopeless future, and because treatment was merely forestalling
death rather than enabling a return to a "normal" existence, the
court held that the physicians were under no legal duty to continue
life-supporting treatment.15 6
149. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1985).
150. I& § 7188.
151. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1015, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
152. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7193 (West Supp. 1985).
153. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. Such an omission could only be
considered unlawful if there was an existing legal duty not to omit such treatment. Id,
154. Id,
155. Id. at 1017-18, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491 (emphasis in original).
156. Id, at 1020, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492. The court noted in dicta that, in the absence
of legislative guidance, there was no legal requirement of prior judicial approval before
any effectuation of a decision to withdraw treatment. Id. at 1020-21, 195 Cal. Rptr. at
492-93. See also Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 197, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
C. Adjusting the Equation in Guardian Cases
In order to respond to the administrative difficulties and legal un-
certainties in allowing patients to effectively assert their right to die,
there is a need to develop a uniform approach in delineating the na-
ture and effect of the competing interests involved. Such rights must
be prioritized to achieve uniform but conscionable results.
With the proper adjustments, the proposed equation may also be
used effectively in deciding guardian cases. The substituted judgment
rule espoused in Saikewicz is fine if information pertaining to the pa-
tient's "actual interests and preferences"157 could always be available
apart from inherent conflicts of interest.158 Without such knowledge,
the equation affords objective assistance by taking into account any
element of doubt as to the patient's preferences.159
D. Hypothetical No. 7- Accounting for Unknown Patient
Preferences
Assume for this example that our patient is fairly young and in a
comatose state. Although on life-support, she is expected to live for
another fifteen years with 90% medical certainty. The treatment is
highly intrusive, although arguably painless, due to the unconscious
condition of the patient. Because there is little or no hope of success-
fully reversing the coma and it is doubtful that the patient will ever
be restored to a cognitive state, the life quality factor drops to a low
20%. There is genuine uncertainty as to the patient's preference
since no living friend or relative has information sufficient to assert
that the patient would desire removal of life support. Therefore, the
factor measuring the patient's desire to live should be assigned a mid-
dle range value of 2 because other cases involving patients similarly
157. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
158. Medical care in guardian cases often hinges upon whether the parents or
guardians desire to pursue treatment in light of their socioeconomic and emotional
state. Goldstein, supra note 11, at 645. Conversely, the decisionmaker today is not
without pressure toward a pro-life position from public outcry and fear of civil and
criminal liability. See, e.g., Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 192, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224; Bar-
ber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1011, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487. Thus, many factors in conflict with
the patient's "actual interests and preferences" bear on the decisionmaking process of
guardians and attending physicians. "Families ... may have mixed motives. They
may demand death to obtain relief from the high costs and tensions inherent in suffer-
ing, but their sense of guilt in this thought may produce the opposite demand, perhaps
in violation of the sick person's rights." Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilem-
mas in the Special-Care Nursery, 289 NEw ENG. J. MED. 890, 893 (1973).
For additional commentary and proposals to ensure reasoned family decisionmaking,
see Comment, Informed Consent: From Disclosure to Patient Participation in Medical
Decisionmaking, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 172 (1981).
159. An objective analysis adopted by the courts would minimize the potential guilt
feelings of the decisionmaker, assure consideration of the state's interest in life, and
promote uniform treatment of incompetent patients.
[Vol. 13: 109, 1985] Right to Die
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
situated have shown them to prefer removal.160 The final analysis
looks like this:
State Concerns Patient's Concerns
(state X (1/intrusion) z (patient's X (1/years X (degree of
interest in desire to expected medical
preserving be removed) to live) certainty)
life)
X (pain & X (1/life X (1/likelihood for
suffering) quality) improvement) 1 6 1
(3) X (1/3) <: (2) X (1/15) X (.90) X (1) X (1/.20) X (1/.30)162
=1 *: =2
RESULT: Patient's concerns prevail.
E. Hypothetical No. 8 - Less Intrusive Treatment
Although less intrusive treatment would rarely include life-sup-
port, there are cases where such treatment, necessary for the pa-
tient's continuing health, may be compelled over parental, religious,
or other objections.' 6 3 Thus, cases involving less intrusive treatment
160. Evidence that most people would or would not act in a certain way is cer-
tainly an important consideration in attempting to ascertain the predilections
of any individual, but care must be taken, as in any analogy, to ensure that
operative factors are similar or at least to take notice of the dissimilari-
ties .... Evidence that most people choose to accept the rigors of chemother-
apy has no direct bearing on the likely choice that Joseph Saikewicz would
have made.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 746-48, 370 N.E.2d at 429-30.
Moreover, where the patient's desire for removal is so low as to warrant a rating of 1
in the equation, it would be improper to discontinue treatment because the patient's
right to life would supersede all other interests. Treatment should not be discontinued
where the relevant circumstances include a markedly low desire for removal, or a con-
tinuing ambivalence, on the part of the patient.
161. This factor replaces the "adjustment potential" factor discussed above. See
supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text. Because psychological and emotional
adjustment is not an appropriate consideration in cases involving comatose patients,
the "likelihood for improvement" factor is substituted for the "adjustment potential"
factor to monitor the futility of ongoing treatment. Thus, where the continued
treatment is merely expected to preserve the status quo-a comatose, vegetative
state-the equation, in the absence of other compelling factors, favors removal. See
Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
162. This factor reflects a mere 30% chance of reversing the coma or restoring the
patient to a conscious condition.
163. See, e.g., In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (com-
pelling treatment over parental objection); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Hes-
ton, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971) (compelling treatment over religious objection);
Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982) (considering whether one can avoid the un-
wanted administration of antipsychotic drugs); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C. 619, 620-21
(1973) (refusing to compel diagnostic/corrective surgery involving a breast biopsy).
may appropriately be considered here even though they do not fall
within the boundaries of traditional right-to-die analysis.
Consider a case where the treatment of a minor patient is less in-
trusive. Suppose daily injections are required to sustain the patient
and, aside from some painful side effects, he is able to fuction nor-
mally, enjoying a high life quality factor of 80%. However, his life
expectancy, due to age and condition, is only ten years. Because
treatment is costly and the patient is expected to live for ten more
years at the most (his condition and side effects worsen over time),
the boy's parents petition to discontinue the painful and expensive
treatment. Although the boy also wishes to discontinue the treat-
ment, the law does not consider him competent to make that deci-
sion. This case must therefore be analyzed using a guardian
approach.
State Concerns Patient's Concerns
(state interest X (1/intrusion) ¢ (patient's X (1/years X (degree of
in preserving desire to expected medical
life) be removed) to live) certainty)
X (pain & X (1/life X (1/likelihood for
suffering) quality) improvement)
(3) X (1/1) ¢* (2) x (1/10) x (.90) X (3) x (1/.80) x (1/.30)
= 3 < : = 2.25
RESULT: State concerns prevail. 1 6 4
VI. THE RIGHT TO DIE FOR DISABLED NEWBORNS AND FETUSES
Although the disabled newborn's right to die clearly deserves pro-
tection, the legal parameters of this interest are not clear.16 5 Ad-
vances in medical technology over the past forty years have
dramatically decreased the infant mortality rate in the United
States.166 One result of this low mortality rate is that many infants
emerge from neonatal intensive care units requiring continual medi-
cal treatment. These infants typically receive a dim prognosis for a
normal life.167 Current medical practice in treating the more se-
164. This result is not without opposition. Problems arise with the countervailing
constitutional privacy rights of the family. See infra notes 180-94 and accompanying
text. Additional problems arise concerning the privacy rights of the neonatal patient.
Widespread common law recognition of both the competent and incompetent non-in-
fant's right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment suggests that a similar right to
refuse' such treatment should be recognized for severely disabled infants. See Parness
& Stevenson, Let Live and Let Die: Disabled Newborns and Contemporary Law, 37 U.
MiAmi L. REV. 43 (1982).
165. For a comprehensive treatment of issues specifically involving the treatment
and nontreatment of disabled newborns in the United States, see generally Parness &
Stevenson, supra note 164.
166. Duff & Campbell, supra note 158, at 890-91.
167. See Ellis, supra note 38, at 420; see also Parness and Stevenson, supra note 164,
at 45-50.
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verely afflicted newborns varies disturbingly. 68
Certain medical practitioners will inevitably seek to treat severely
disabled newborns regardless of the nature of the treatment, the
dimness of the prognosis or contrary parental desires. However, the
nontreatment of such newborns is a common occurrence in hospitals
and other health care facilities across the country. 169 Some argue
that nontreatment may be "good medical practice" in some cases. 170
Although nontreatment may be common, those who decide to treat
the disabled infant lack consistency in approaching seemingly identi-
cal problems.171
These divergent views frame the issue. Should treatment be com-
pelled in all cases, or may a disabled infant exercise the right to die?
As noted earlier, the right to die for non-infants already seems
rooted in the common law,172 for just as the guarantee of the right to
privacy "reaches out to protect the freedom of a woman to terminate
pregnancy under certain conditions . . . so it encompasses the right
of a patient to preserve his or her right to privacy against unwanted
infringements of bodily integrity in appropriate circumstances."173
Such recognition of both the competent and incompetent non-infant's
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment suggests that a similar right
should be recognized for severely disabled newborns.174 It has been
noted, however, that applying this suggestion has its problems.175
As previously noted, courts have allowed patients to refuse treat-
ment based on the severity of the resulting bodily intrusion. 176 Dis-
abled newborns, however, cannot make their own decisions and, of
course, cannot assert their right of privacy to avoid significant bodily
intrusions. In severe cases, disabled infants may require institution-
alization with no hope of ever seeing the outside world. Dependency
168. See Parness and Stevenson, supra note 164, at 45-50.
169. 1974 Hearings, supra note 11.
170. Robertson, supra note 82, at 214. But see Strong, The Tiniest Newborns, 13
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 14 (1983) (finding no compelling arguments in favor of with-
holding aggressive treatment of infants with very low weight at birth).
171. A prominent physician testifying before Congress stated that "[i]t is disquiet-
ing to discover that infants apparently have an identical condition and may be treated
differently, and some may survive and some not." 1974 Hearings, supra note 11, at 17
(statement of Dr. Raymond S. Duff); see also Is There a Right to Die-Quickly?, 80 J.
PEDIATRICS 904, 905 (1972) (two divergent opinions regarding treatment of children
born with meningomyeloceles).
172. See supra notes 125-56 and accompanying text.
173. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424 (citations omitted).
174. Parness & Stevenson, supra note 164, at 54.
175. Id at 57.
176. See supra note 54.
on narcotic medication and medical machinery is not uncommon.
Necessary treatment can lead to, or aggravate, physical handicaps
and impair mental development.177 Lack of competence or ability to
voice an objection to treatment should not preclude termination of an
infant's painful life in certain circumstances. The severely disabled
newborn should have the same privacy right as the severely disabled
adult.
Since the infant's decisionmaker is subject to criminal or civil lia-
bility,178 courts and legislators must afford protection not only to the
newborn but also to the decisionmaker. Some commentators suggest
that court approval minimizes the guilt feelings of the decisionmaker,
assures consideration of the state interest in preserving life, and facil-
itates the uniform treatment of disabled newborns. 179
A. The Competing Interests
The constitutional rights of parents to make decisions concerning
their children stem from the fourteenth amendment's concept of per-
sonal liberty 8 0 and the penumbral right to privacy.' 8 ' The state may
not deprive a parent of custody, for example, without a sufficient
showing of imminent harm' 8 2 or parental unfitness, even if it would
incontrovertibly be in the child's best interest.183 The Supreme
Court has stated that parental autonomy is sacrosanct and that "cus-
tody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder."184
This is not to say that a court is by any means powerless to over-
rule parental decisions. Parental autonomy is not absolute. The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal has noted that "the state has a right, indeed, a
duty, to protect children."185 State officials may intervene in family
matters to safeguard childrens' health, education and emotional well-
177. See, e.g., In re Philip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 800, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 50 (1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980); Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d at 700, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
178. See supra note 158.
179. Parness & Stevenson, supra note 164, at 60.
180. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (married women have right to procure
abortion).
181. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
182. In re Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984) ("det-
riment standard" used in custody award decision under Family Act allowing state in-
tervention when imminent harm to the child is present).
183. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (clear and convincing evidence of ne-
glect required for termination of parental rights in natural child).
184. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
185. Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d at 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51. See also Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979).
[Vol. 13: 109, 1985] Right to Die
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
being.186
One of the most basic values protected by the state is the sanctity of human
life .... Where parents fail to provide their children with adequate medical
care, the state is justified to intervene. However, since the state should usu-
ally defer to the wishes of the parents, it has a serious burden of justification
before abridging parental autonomy by substituting its judgment for that of
the parents.1
8 7
In determining whether parental autonomy should be abridged,
courts have considered such factors as the seriousness of the condi-
tion requiring treatment, 88 the risks inherent in the proposed treat-
ment,189 the wishes of the minor (if such are known), and the
benefits of the treatment.190 Judicial preemption of parental auton-
omy is appropriate only when the child's physical condition is in im-
minent danger of becoming impaired and his welfare demands
judicial intervention.191 If there is uncertainty regarding the benefit
of the treatment or the welfare of the infant, the interest of the fam-
ily should prevail. If the best interests of the child or the correct
course of action are not self-evident, the family's decision should not
be supplanted by that of a court.
Families know their values, priorities and resources better than anyone else.
Presumably they, with the doctor, can make the better choices as a private af-
fair. Certainly, they, more than anyone else, must live with the consequences.
Most of these families know they cannot place that child for adoption because
no one else wants the child. If they cannot cope adequately with the child and
their other responsibilities and survive as a family, they may feel that the
death option is a forced choice .... But that is not necessarily bad, and who
knows of a better way.1 9 2
Notwithstanding the state's obligation to protect the child, a fam-
ily's decision deserves great deference. Competing with the state in-
terest in preserving life and protecting children are the endangered
privacy interests of newborns, parents and other family members.19 3
If these privacy rights are to have any meaning or effect, the state
186. See, e.g., In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 670-71, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 654 (Fam. Ct.
1970). For a review of cases involving children's, parent's, and family rights, see Wingo
& Freytag, Decisions Within the Family: A Clash of Constitutional Rights, 67 IOWA L.
REV. 401 (1982); Keiter, Privacy, Children, and Their Parents: Reflections On and Be-
yond the Supreme Court's Approach, 66 MINN. L. REV. 459 (1982).
187. Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d at 801-02, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51 (citation omitted).
188. See, e.g., In re Brooklyn Hosp., 45 Misc. 2d 914, 258 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct.
1965).
189. See, e.g., Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d at 802, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
190. See, e.g., Mills, 457 U.S. at 297-98.
191. Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d at 701-02, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 967-68.
192. Goldstein, supra note 11 at 656 (quoting Kelsey, Shall These Children Live? A
Conversation With Dr. Raymond S. Dqff, 72 REFLECTION, Jan. 1975 at 4, 7 (published
by Yale Divinity School)).
193. See generally Wingo & Freytag, supra note 186; Keiter, supra note 186.
must show compelling justification for their preemption. As medical
capabilities continue to progress in defiance of mortality, the state's
burden of justification will decrease to a point where the privacy in-
terests, as presently defined, will become legal fictions. For this rea-
son, the law must keep abreast of advancements in medical science to
ensure that privacy rights are redefined accordingly. 194
B. Problems in the Future: Advancements in Medicine May Vitiate
Privacy
As discussed previously, state interests may override individual pri-
vacy rights where compelled treatment requires lesser degrees of
bodily intrusion. 195 It is likely that future advancements in medical
technology will continue to improve treatment methods and reduce
the accompanying bodily intrusions.19 6 At some unknown time in
the future, it may be medically possible to perform surgeries, biop-
sies, tissue removals, and the like without the degree of bodily intru-
sion required by present procedures. Continued progress in
medicine, however, will certainly diminish the privacy rights of fu-
ture patients confronted with life and death decisions.
Within the past ten years, courts have struggled with cases involv-
ing the right to life of incompetent persons who need medical treat-
ment to stay alive. From such decisions a consensus has emerged: in
certain cases, the right to life is so strong that contrary privacy inter-
ests cannot overcome it. This right to life exists where medical treat-
ment preserves life rather than merely prolongs it,197 produces little,
if any, pain and suffering, and constitutes no significant bodily
intrusion. 198
The state interest in preserving life is not presently dependent on
the consent of the individual whose life is to be preserved. The state
194. For a history of recent unsuccessful regulatory attempts by the Reagan Ad-
ministration, see American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C.
1983). See also 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (proposed
July 5, 1983).
There are, however, certain instances where legislation might be bath effective and
appropriate. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS
IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH: A RE-
PORT ON MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH
(1981) (commission's attempt to draft and develop a statute establishing a uniform def-
inition of death). See also H.R. 6492, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (legislation attempting
to establish judicial remedies for handicapped infants who die through the deliberate
or negligent nontreatment of health care providers); Shapiro, Medical Treatment of
Defective Newborns: An Answer to the "Baby Doe" Dilemma, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
137 (1983).
195. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
196. Radiation therapy, laser surgery, orthoscopy, and various "wonder drugs" are
recently developed and familiar examples of less intrusive forms of treatment.
197. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 54 and 57 and accompanying text.
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has the power to effectively assert the right to life over the patient
who would not otherwise wish to exercise that right, especially
where minors and other legally incompetent persons are con-
cerned.19 9 Courts have recognized an unassailable state right to pre-
serve life among various categories of incompetent persons. For
example, persons incompetent by virtue of their youth have been af-
forded life-preserving treatment despite parental objections,200 as
have mentally incompetent adults, notwithstanding their inability to
consent to such treatment.201
C. A Disturbing Conflict: An Overlap of Constitutional Rights
What happens when the intrusion required to remove an embryo
and rear it in vitro in a laboratory, or transfer it to another womb,
becomes lesser than or equivalent to the intrusion necessary to effec-
tuate a present-day clinical abortion?202 Of course, this inquiry re-
quires revisiting viability concepts much like those dealt with at
199. State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1982); Von Holden v. Chap-
man, 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1982) (hunger-striking prisoners can be force-
fed). But cf Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982) (court refused to sanc-
tion force-feedings of a sane and rational prisoner on a hunger strike because of the
intrusive impact of such action on the prisoner's bodily privacy); see also Note, Pris-
oner Hunger Strikes: Constitutional Protection for a Fundamental Right, 20 Am.
CRIM. L. REV. 569 (1983).
200. The state has met its burden of justification to overcome the parents' decision
in cases involving: (1) removal of a malignant eye, In re Vasko, 238 A.D. 128, 263
N.Y.S. 552 (1933); (2) transfusion for severe burns, In re Brooklyn Hosp., 45 Misc. 2d
914, 258 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1965); (3) transfusion for corrective surgery of grotesque
deformities caused by neurofibromatosis, In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d
644 (Fain. Ct. 1970), affd, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972); and
(4) surgical repair of a newborn's meningomyelocele (a protrusion of membrane
through a defect in the spinal column), In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965
(Sup. Ct. 1979).
201. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670
(1971) (adult may be compelled to submit to blood transfusion despite incompetency
and contrary religious beliefs). Deferring to parental autonomy, courts have refused to
order treatment in several cases. See, e.g., In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980) (involving surgery for a retarded per-
son's congenital heart defect); In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 419
N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979) (involving radiation and chemotherapy for treatment of Hodgkin's
disease); In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955) (involving surgery to correct
a hairlip and a cleft palate); In re Green, 220 Pa. Super. 191, 286 A.2d 681 (1971) (in-
volving surgery to correct spinal curvature); In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. D. 561 (1912) (in-
volving surgery to prevent crippling by rickets); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126
P.2d 765 (1942) (involving amputation of grossly enlarged and useless arm).
202. To dispel skepticism regarding the realistic possibility of such advanced medi-
cal procedures, see Rhoden, The New Neonatal Dilemma: Live Births from Late Abor-
tions, 72 GEO. L.J. 1451 (1984); Scott, Test Tube Babies, Experimental Medicine and
Allied Problems, 58 AusTRALIAN L.J. 405 (1984).
length in Roe v. Wade.203 However, the heuristic value of this now
hypothetical problem should not be ignored. The problem is illustra-
tive of the fate of individual privacy rights in the face of medical pro-
gress, which continues to reduce infant mortality rates.20 4
Courts will eventually be called upon to decide among counter-
vailing constitutional rights in these and other similar areas. How
can such cases be decided without inflicting unconscionable results
on one class or another?205 The issue of court-ordered medical treat-
ment in the context of countervailing constitutional rights has been
addressed by state courts, but has been almost entirely limited to
religious objections raised by parents.206 In determining, for exam-
ple, whether to compel medical treatment over religious objections,
courts have usually favored the constitutional rights of the patient
where it was the patient's own religious preferences being chal-
lenged.207 Where the parents' or guardian's religious preferences
have resulted in nontreatment of a minor, for example, the states
have favored treatment for the child under its police powers and its
interests in guarding against child neglect and abuse. 20 8
The question has yet to be addressed, however, of whether a
mother's right to privacy would prevail over her embryo's right to
life (stemming from the state's interest in preempting a needless de-
struction) where the mother seeks, and qualifies for, an abortion
203. 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1973). After the fetus becomes viable, which happens dur-
ing the second trimester of pregnancy, the state's interest in preserving the potential-
ity of human life becomes compelling, permitting the state to regulate abortions. Id.
204. At the time of this writing, a physician is under investigation for implanting a
nonapproved artificial heart during emergency surgery into a patient who had not con-
sented to the implantation. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
205. Of course, only one of the two opposite interests can ultimately prevail in de-
ciding whether to continue life-sustaining medical treatment.
206. Where the federal constitutional right is not relevant, the state's strong inter-
est in protecting the sanctity of human life still makes the newborn's interests para-
mount to all others. See Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225
(recognizing the California constitutional right to privacy); In re Guardianship of Roe,
383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981) (relying on state common law in upholding an indi-
vidual's right to decide whether to receive potentially dangerous medical treatment).
Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 633 (recognizing the New Jersey constitutional right
to privacy). For a statute enunciating legislative policy protecting critically ill or defec-
tive newborns, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.36.1 (West Supp. 1985), said to be the
first state law of its kind. See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 275 (West Supp.
1985).
207. See, e.g., Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re
Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C. 619 (1973). But cf. In re President and Directors of Georgetown
College, 331 F.2d 100 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
208. Abandoning medical treatment of newborns is said to undermine statutes on
homicide, child abuse, child neglect, and child abuse reporting. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE §§ 275, 286(b) (West Supp. 1985) (promoting health care for critically
ill newborns).
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under Roe v. Wade.209 Were a court to decide this delicate social is-
sue under currently prevailing law, it would not only be able, but in-
deed behooved, to find for the embryo and the state. Under current
law, the consensus is that no right to die exists for the embryo2 10
where the intrusion is minimal, the treatment (in this case, in vitro
rearing) involves no pain or suffering, and the embryo's life will be
preserved rather than merely prolonged.211 The mother's right to
privacy would not be invaded under this analysis because the physical
intrusion is lesser than or equal to the intrusion required for the
clinical abortion she seeks.
If advanced medical procedures enable the removal and rearing of
an embryo in this manner, a woman's presently defined right to pri-
vacy regarding abortion decisions may be rendered moot.212 The pri-
vacy right set forth in Roe v. Wade addressed privacy rights
encompassing a "decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy." 213 If the state were to effectuate removal of the embryo for
209. For example, the mother may receive an abortion in the first trimester of
pregnancy. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
210. Assuming arguendo that the embryo would be entitled to constitutional pro-
tection, it would properly be subject to a right-to-die analysis. Roe, however, held that
an embryo in the first trimester of human prenatal development is not yet entitled to
any constitutional protection that would undermine the mother's privacy rights. Roe,
410 U.S. at 163-65. "[T]he word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does
not include the unborn." Id. at 158. Viability is the yardstick for affording legal rights
and protection to the unborn. Id, at 161-62. However, the state has another important
and legitimate interest-protecting the potentiality of human life. Id. at 162. It would
seem, then, that the embryo in our hypothetical is viable and thus entitled to protec-
tion under Roe. Applying a strict Roe analysis, the mother's privacy rights become
subordinate to the state's interest in preserving potential life where the embryo is ca-
pable of survival outside the womb.
211. See supra notes 165-79 and accompanying text.
212. The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by
denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically
diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or addi-
tional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psy-
chological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed
by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the
unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family al-
ready unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.... [Tihe addi-
tional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be
involved.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. If the removal procedures proposed by the state eliminate the
detriments recognized by the Roe court, can it be said that women still have privacy
rights sufficient to overcome state regulation in this area? The answer to this query
depends on whether the law seeks to protect women from the incidents of unwanted
motherhood or whether there is a sublime privacy right which cannot be abridged ab-
sent compelling circumstances.
213. Id,
rearing in vitro, the mother's pregnancy is nonetheless terminated.
The question arising is whether the state can legally compel the
mother to instead submit to the removal procedure. 214 The resulting
child would probably become a ward of the state because Roe protects
the mother from other incidents of pregnancy, such as invasions of
privacy, which accompany the compelled rearing of her unwanted
child.215
After considering all of the legal contortions, reflect for a moment
on what has been accomplished in furthering the state interest in
preserving life, notwithstanding the conflicting privacy rights of the
mother and the embryo: 1) a woman who desires a legal abortion has
been compelled to submit to the removal of her embryo for rearing
in vitro; 2) a ward of the state has been created; 3) a child alive but
not presently viable has been either raised in a laboratory environ-
ment, released to surrogate parents for implantation, or institutional-
ized until such time as adoptive parents take over; and 4) a legally
competent woman has been forced to submit to medical treatment
without her consent and deliver up her offspring to the government
against her contrary wishes.
The woman, of course, had a choice-she could have elected to
abandon termination efforts and thus avoid the state-ordered re-
moval. So what has happened to her right of privacy, her right to
bodily integrity, and her liberty interest, assured by Roe, regarding
"activities relating to marriage .... procreation .... contraception,
... family relationships, ... and child rearing and education
. . ."?216 This is to say nothing of the privacy rights of the embryo.
To what risks of deformity, underdevelopment, and future emotional
or psychological mishaps is the child subjected by such a process?
VII. CONCLUSION
The problems with administering such a controversial and socially
repugnant right do not stem merely from balancing the interests
which inherently compete with its administration. Equally vexing
difficulties are encountered in simply delineating what those inter-
ests are and in ascertaining how they weigh against one another. In
other words, difficulties arise not only in formulating appropriate
214. It seems that the only existing legal vehicle for expectant mothers opposing
the removal procedure in this case would be that of a cause of action for battery. One
court has stated: "A long line of cases, . . . have held that where a doctor performs
treatment in the absence of an informed consent, there is an actionable battery. The
obvious corollary to this principle is that a competent adult patient has the legal right
to refuse medical treatment." Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1015, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 489;
see also Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 194, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
215. See supra note 212.
216. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
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equations which balance the competing interests, but also in as-
signing satisfactory values to the constants and variables contained
therein.
Even if we do formulate acceptable equations which aid us in as-
sessing competing interests, these equations must be adaptable to
changing times and changing circumstances. The determination to be
made is no longer one of rote balancing, weighed blindly in the
venerable tradition on Athena's scales of justice. Courts, philoso-
phers, theologians, and laymen would disagree as to the respective
weights assigned to the equation's variables. But while medical sci-
ence has progressed by leaps and bounds, affecting human life and
destiny in exponential dimensions, our courts and legislatures have
mostly lagged behind in this sensitive area, still tinkering with con-
cepts of law and medicine which date back to the fourth century B.C.
While scientists split atoms and measure their diameters with elec-
tronic equipment to within a hundredth of an angstrom, it seems that
lawmakers muddle in the distance, trying to make similar measure-
ments in cubits.
The point being made is that times have changed. Life as we know
it has changed. Death, as defined by law and medicine, has changed.
Our law must keep abreast of these changes if it is to have any mean-
ing and effect in such a socially volatile area.
Amidst all of the doubt involving right-to-die issues, one thing is
certain: privacy rights are sure to become extinct unless the laws gov-
erning the right to refuse medical treatment are overhauled to re-
flect the realities of current medical practice. Courts which have
dealt with these sensitive issues have always relied on the notion of
bodily intrusion when weighing the patient's case for removal; thus,
the courts have afforded protection from only physical invasions.
The unfortunate result of this focus is that one's privacy includes
profoundly more than freedom from physical invasion, especially
where medical treatment becomes progressively less physical by the
day. In short, if individual privacy is what we seek to protect, we
must embrace more than the mere physical implications of compelled
treatment.
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